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ABSTRl\.CT
Managers are increasingly aware that they need to leverage their company's-resources in
order to deal with the challenges of the changing business world in the 90' s and the
coming millennium. The aim of this research is to evaluate how organisations are utilising
enterprise wide packaged software ..pplications in order to achieve strategic and
transformational benefits for their organisations.
The relentless change in the business landscape has meant that organisations have needed
to respond in increasingly innovative ways to stay in business. This has been more so for
South African crganisetions which have now been accepted back into the world
community after years of isolation due the country's political policy of apartheid. The
watershed years of the early 1990's opened up once forbidden markets to South Afiican
('rganisations and in doing so launched these organisations into a global competitive
environment. To compete effectively in these newly opened and changed markets,
companies have sought to reposition themselves. Since information technology is clearly
embedded in many of these organisations they are increasingly turning to infonnetion
technology to underpin their new businesses strategies. The relevance of the information
architecture an organisation chooses will also be explored in this research, as the flexibility
and structure of the architecture will determine what strategic options are available to the
company.
Many organisations are implementing software packages as opposed to writing their own
software to fit unique processes. This trend is strengthened by advancements on the
technological front, the disappointment of cost overruns with previously in-house written
applications, and the critical shortage of experienced IT (information technology) skills ill
the country. Business can no longer wait years for a system to be developed. The
implementation of enterprise wide packaged software applications facilitates integration
and process transformation which many organisations see as fundamental to their new
strategies to remain competitive.
This research showed that the implementation of enterprise wide packaged software
applications forces change on an organisation in that a number of domains within the
organisation are challenged. Processes need revisiting, human resources undergo a change
and teamwork is facilitated. There is a new sharing of knowledge and information within
the organisation, and such information systems are deployed rapidly and with the business
objectives firmly in place. Whilst there were strategic and transformational benefits, there
were also a number of unexpected benefits. The changes brought about by such
implementations were largely underestimated by managers within these organisations.
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CHAPTER 1
1.0 INTRODUCTION
This chapter presents a brief overview of the research problem as well as ~e research
process, and introduces the reader to a number of subjects relevant to the research.
1.1 OVERVIEW
II: recent years, trends in the usage of information technology has changed dramatically.
This change in direction needs to be examined in conjunction with an overview of how
business and organisations have changed over the past few decades. The growth of the
significance of 'information' can be attributed to the shift from the activities of the
industrial era to the information handling functions of the modern organisation, The
industrial revolution paved the way for specialisation in the work place - many people
contributed to the end product; which has meant that there had to be a passing along of
information. That many people contributed to the end product introduced a level of
complexity, which in turn drove the demand for greater efficiency and more information,
Whilst this trend took decades to develop, as the complexity of the production cycle
increased, so the demand for more information increased. Linked to this gradual change
in the organisation of the workplace, came the successful inventions in the field of
electronics.
1.1.1 The evolution of I.T.
In the early 1950's computers were used mainly in the areas of scientific and mathematical
research. These machines were large, complex and difficult to program. The emphasis
was on their processing capability. 'Management had very little to do with these
computers and they were left to the technologists to handle.
By the 1960's the need had arisen for the automation of routine tasks within business
organisations. These computers were seen as a means to store and retrieve information.
They were expensive machines which were controlled by centralised data processing
departments. These systems were initially justified to save money, as headcounts could be
significantly reduced. As the focus was more on storage and retrieval of data, the
specification for software was unique to the organisations' requirements. The programs
written were to automate existing manual systems within the organisation. The business
climate was insular with markets clearly defined. Of great importance to the company in
this decade, was efficiency. The time it took to develop these new systems received little
focus. Because of the technology, and management's discomfort with this technology,
acceptance of development time for automating software was the norm. This was the
latest state of the art technology, which was perceived to be adding value in that it
automated office tasks, and saved money in terms of people overheads. If a system added
to efficiency and was seen to be able to contribute to cutting costs, it was embraced.
The 70's saw the advent of terminals throughout the organisation. Whilst in the 60's
computers stood apart from the rest of the organisation, the 70' s ended the isolation of
the computer department. The computer moved from batch processing to interactive
processing. The automation of office activities was slowly changing. Information
technology was seen to be able to enhance product lines and contribute to process
improvements. This contributed to more complex software specifications. Owing to the
fact that the computer industry (information industry) had grown so quickly, skills were
both difficult to come by, and expensive. Added to this it was perceived that software had
to be written to suit the organisation's needs, thus most software was written in-house.
Speed and capacity of computers had grown which allowed for the broader application of
software. Information was becoming an economic commodity, This further contributed
to increased specialisation and 'was seen by organisations as specific to their business.
By the 1980's IT was central to the organisation. IT touched every part of the business,
and had penetrated deeply into the value chain. IT was now viewed as capable of being
integral to the business strategy. The advent of the personal computer changed the
relationship between IT and the company IT was now no longer seen in a supportive
role, but rather as a commodity that could also be exploited. The continuous evolutionary
changes in technology led to greater expectations of what it could deliver.
The 1980's was also the decade that led to the greatest criticism ofIT in that it wes seen
as not being able to deliver on promised business benefits. Critical in-house written
systems were expensive to maintain and, in some cases, impossible to replace without
severe disturbance and risk to the organisation. In this decade the demographics of
organisations were also changing from command and control organisations to information-
based organisations. The accelerating pace of industry change demanded more from IT.
Markets became fragmented, product life cycles accelerated and the globalisation of
industries meant that competitors were multiplying. This led to organisations looking for
software that could resha pe their business - thus the need for integrated software to assist
the organisation in attaining or maintaining competitive advantage. Software development
needed to be rapid. Companies turned to software packages in the need for rapid new
implementations. Previously there was a need for software to automate current processes
hence unique 'in-house' written systems written to specification, were adequate.
However, the rapidly changing demands of business, which transcended barriers of time
and distance, and the required integration , . the multiple facets of an organisation led to
the perception that in-house written S)'i/ < '" took to') much time to write and were costly
to maintain. Toffler (1990) points to the fact that I,here has been a powershift from slow
to fast.
By the 1990's organisations were undergoing huge ChiCliU<' directly attributable to
information technology. Davenport & Short (1990) submit that information technology
and business process reengineering began transforming organisations. The locus of
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knowiedge and hence power had changed. Information and its technology had moved in
responsibility to line managers. IT was now breaking down barriers between industries
and creating new opportunities for competitive advantage. The rise of enterprise resource
planning (ERP) software was prominent. Throughout the 80's and the 90's there was a
significant shift in tne way some organisations structured their businesses - the influence of
business process reengineering had contributed to a concentration on processes, which
resulted in a shift away from functional departments. It was evident that the structure of
these organise, om: are changing - structures were becoming flatter.
In this decade the evolution of computer architecture has had a significant impact
Integrated packages were seen as being a better solution to legacy systems owing to th.~
speed of business changes. Business demanded systems that would respond to change
rapidly, and without software changes. Integrated packages now covered a variety of
functional models, including general accounting, manufacturing, distribution, logistics and
human resources. These: reduced the need to reconcile data across modules, they
supported more detailed drill down analysis and allowed for maintenance activities without
changing the code. ERP software was now not relegated to the backoffice but was being
viewed as part of the business strategy. IT was being increasingly involved in the business
strategy of the organisation. It was in this decade that South African organisations were
accepted back into the world community, after years of isolation.
1.1.2 IT and Business Strategy
Perhaps one of the more significant developments in IT was the shift in recognising that IT
could assist in changing the wayan organisation does business.(Venkatraman,1991;
Hammer & Champy,1995; Davenport & Short, 1990). IT war seen to be able to enhance
an organisation's strategy, and in some cases change the strategic options evailable to the
organisation.
The quest for competitive advantage saw companies turning to IT to leverage their
resources. (Rockart & Short, 1989; Short & Venkatraman, 1992) Competitive advantage
was seen to grow out of an entire system of activities with IT being incorporated. IT
could no longer be static - systems needed to be dynamic. This in tum led to a focus on
processes - to exploit technology, an analysis of how the organisation actually does its
work was undertaken. This led to a number of approaches, amongst them being business
PWQl;SS reengineering, total quality management, building competencies and capabilities.
Integrated information systems were seen as a method to enable the organisation to attain
its vision or strategy. However, this technology could not be the organisation's primary
solution, because competitors could copy those solutions, so the advantage given to the
organisation could be short lived.
It is widely recognised that information technology fundamentally changes what
knowledge is useful, where the knowledge is located, who has access to this information
and how it gets applied. (Clarke, 1989). Ga'liers, (1994) draws a distinction between
strategic information systems and competitive information systems Strategic Information
3
Systems (SIS) directly support the creation and implementation of an organisation's
strategic plan. Competitive information systems support the ;:;~ecution of strategy by
improving the value relationships of the firm in its competitive environment.
The role of IT has shifted from its traditional backoffice support role towards being part of
the organisation's strategy. Allen & Scott Morton (1994) point to strategic management
falling into three categories:
• Corporate strategy: being the interrelationships among besinesses
e Business strategy: which maximises the best organisational advantages to compete in
the marketplace
• Functional strategy: which reflects the efficient allocation of resources allocated to a
particular function.
IT strategy usually occurs at the functional level, in order to support the chosen business
strategy. But IT can be used to influence markets as well as shape the basis of
competition. The role ofIT has important implications for organisationel transformation.
Successful companies can be distinguished by their abilities t,:) use IT to transform their
businesses. Transformational strategies will be deait with in section 2.3.
1.1.3 Software Packages
Few organisations can claim that their legacy systems do not present a problem. For many
companies the inability to change these systems quickly to fit with changed business
requirements has driven a new scrutiny of thei, information systems. Given that there is a
critical shortage of IT skills in South Africa and given that traditional systems have
brought cost overruns and failed system expectations including that they are slow to
develop, many organisations are investigating enterprise wide packaged software
applications to deliver the value they are seeking. In the past most companies wrote their
own software, but with the increased complexity of business environments and the
increased pace at which these systems are expected to be developed, software packages
have become an attractive alternative for organisations. Added to this is the knowledge
that traditional approaches to software development can mean that the application can
easily become obsolete before the application is delivered,
Many organisations seek to revitalise their strategies to deal with the changing world and
packages offer a solution. It is widely recognised (Hammer & Champy 1995;
Venkatraman, 1991; Galliers, 1994) that the power of technology enables organisations to
break old rules and create new ways of working. It is precisely this shift together with
advanced technical architectures that has raised ;1:,';. expectation that ERP software can
deliver the benefits that legacy systems couldn't.
According to the annual Worldwide Software Revue and Forecast published by
International Data Corp.{Computing SA, July 1997) the packaged software market grew
an estimated 14,7% in 1996. Application markets showed vendor revenues of $42,9
billion in 1995 and is expected to grow to $78 billion by the year 2000.
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The four companies selected for this research have chosen to use a software package as a
tool to assist in transforming their organisations. Each of these companies have in the past
made extensive use of information technology, and all have made the move from having
legacy systems to packaged software, thus 110neof the companies have a clean slate from
which to move as advocated by Hammer & Champy. (1995) Nolan's Stage Model
(1979) provides a framework for understanding at what stage of change ear~ organisation
was at. Figure 1.1 depicts Nolan's Stage Model.
IntllaUon Contagion Control Integmtlon Da!a Maturttv
Integration
Figure 1.1 - Nolan's Stage Model
At stage one there is low control, some slack and little or no information systems
planning. At stage two there is greater slack in order to encourage use and lack of
planning. Costs rise and costs from lack of integration become visible. Stage three
presents with high level of controls. Information systems planning is given increased
emphasis. There is emphasis on integration at. stage four together with more emphasis on
user control of information system costs and the use of databases. At stage five the focus
is on data administration. There is some slack to encourage development of systems
which contribute to strategic advantage of the organisation. Application portfolio is
complete and matches organisational objectives at stage six.
All four of the companies have felt that their legacy systems were an inhibitor to change
and to meeting the changing business needs of the 90's and the future, Each of the
organisations is at a different stage of their projects.
The organisations selected for research purposes are all implementing the same suite of
software. j\.g there are a number of variables (social, economic and political) within each
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organisation, it was decided to keep one of the variables the same. The common element
in all cases was that an enterprise wide packaged software application, known as JD
Edwards, was used The framework of JD Edwards -,(JDE) World System Architecture is
presented in Figure 1.2
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JD Edwards (IDE), an enterprise resource planning (ERP) system, comprises applications
such as financial accounting, distribution, logistics, manufacturing and human resources.
The software has been ranked as the third largest ERP solutions provider in the world.
The company has customers in 90 countries around the world. JDE has two technologies
to deliver their enterprise applications. WorldSoftware (along with its client/server
counterpart WorldVision) is an RPG solution that runs on an IBM AS400. They also
have 'OneWorld> which is a multi-platform distributed object, open systems solution that
coexists with WorldSoftware. OncWorld runs on a heterogeneous network IDE
maintains that their flexible software upgrades to new releases quickly and encourages
quick translation of business needs to sound business practices. Their 'Configurable
Network Computing' architecture accommcdates the Internet, intranets and extranets.
IDE offers a co-existence architecture in that customers can have their host-centric
(World Software), client/server (Worldvision) and configurable network computing
(OneWorld) solutions running on the same AS400, sharing the same data, and interacting
with each other to support integrated business processes.
In order to examine how organisations are utilizing this package to achieve strategic and
transformational benefits, the relevant literature has been reviewed. This is presented in
the following chapter.
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CHAPTfR2
2.0 LITERATURE REViEW
In this chapter, models of strategy in relation to Porter, and Treacy and Wiersema wi.ll
be presented. Organisational transformation models, including Business Process
Reengineering, Core Competencies and Capabilities will also be presented. Attention
will also be drawn to literature relating to Information Systems Architecture and
Software Packages.
2.1 INTRODUCTION
As global competition becomes a reality for South African organisations, these
companies are responding by rethinking their business strategies. To reposition
themselves either to maintain their competitive advantage or to obtain a competitive
advantage, many organlsat. ElS are seeking from information technology (IT) to
support them in this endeavour. Prager et al. (1996) argues that in the changing world
of business the IT function can no longer create and manage static systems as busine ...s
is changing too rapidly. IT leveraged to support the new business strategies can be
flexible and integrated largely due to technology advancements, hence its importance
to organisations seeking advantage over other companies in their industry.
In this chapter tr. following themes will be presented:
2.2 MODELS OF STRATEGY
Balancing the needs of today with the plans of the future will always be th", ultimate
challenge for management. The complexity of this challenge and the disparity between
current capabilities and future objectives has led to many interpretations and models of
strategy. Normann and Ramirez (1993) define strategy as the way a company defines
its business and links together knowledge and relationships. Porter (1996) expands on
this by submitting that the essence of strategy is the activities of the organisation - that
is, choosing to perform activities differently or to perform different activities from it's
rivals
2.21 Porter's Five Forces Model
Porter (1985), in his work 'Competitive Advantage, Creating and Sustaining Superior
Advantage' identified five competitive drives on an organisation and within these five
forces a number offactors th ",.influenced their importance. The five forces include:
e Potential. entrants, where the structure of competition can be changed by the threat
of new entrants to the market. Even if new entrants are unsuccessful, they can
alter the framework within which existing rivals compete.
• The bargaining power of supplier s where suppliers affect the forces of competition
through their pricing and negotiating strengths.
" The h ', :'!j :mwer of purchasers where the choices that customers make, and their
resultant i;~i'gait1ingpower also affects competition.
• The threat of product substitution due to price performance of alternative inputs;
the costs of switching to alternative input produc:ts; differentiation between
alternative inputs; environmenta. »ressures and the willingness of the buyer to
change source is an alter-ative form of competition.
e Rivalry between existing x-mpetitors gives rise to an impact on each others
competitive positions and their adopted strategies.
!"}orter maintained that a business has to be aware of these factors; . analysing it's
competitive position and in defining it's strategies. He et-essed that these five factors
would be different in varying industries and even with different companies in the same
industry.
Bargaining power
,,[suppliors
Posslbililyo[
na'vVsrrivals
[~:;':-J---
IndUstry
CompEtiloro
Buyecs
Threalof
subsWUfs..:; Buying powercf purchasers
Figure 2.1 - Porter's Five Forces Model.
According to Ward et al (1990) the activities ofdesigning, producing, marketing,
delivering and supporting its product (i.e, the value chain) can only be understood in
the context of the business unit. For overall performance to be achieved states Ward,
these are the things a business must do to exist - and they must be carried out
effectively and linked together efficiently. The secondary activities add value :ndirect1y
but that value is only realisable through primary activity results. Thus the basic value
chain model is a form of business activity analysis - a way of breaking down a complex
enterprise into its component parts.
Lindsay (1996) asserts that Porter's analysis gives insufficient attention to the role of
information systems in changing the boundaries of intra-industry competition. He
views the five forces model as a useful check on what business an organisation is in
and who their competitors are. Further to this, McNurlin and Sprague (1996) add that
there are four supporting activities that underlie the entire the entire value chain. They
identify them as organisational infrastructure, human resources management,
technology development and procurement. McNurlin and Sprague add that by
studying how a firm performs (i.e. inbound logistics, operations, outbound logistics,
marketing ano sales, and service) a company could explore how it could add more
value at ever; activity. Citing Rayport and Sviolka, McNurlin and Sprague suggest
that companies treat information as a support element and not as a source of value
itself. Further to this, they add that to take advantage of business changes requires a
shift in focus from the value chain where 'make and sell' is the focus (i.e. supply side
thinking) to 'demand-side' thinking where companies call 'sense and respond'.
2.2.2 Porter's Generic Strategies
Building on his Five Forces Model, Porter and Millar (1985) claimed that there are
only three generic strategies, the three stratesies being cost leadership, differentiation
and focus.
The objective of a cost leadership strategy is to become the low cost supplier in the
organisation's industry. Price will be the determining factor where products or
services are similar. Other criteria's of value to the customer should not however be
discounted. Ward et al (1990) make the point that the emphasis (with a low cost
strategy) on process efficiency and tight control systems, facilitates taking advantage of
technology to increase profitability. Information then, is not seen as a key resource for
exploitation, but as an overhead cost that <leedsto be processed efficiently.
When an organisation distinguishes itself from its competitors Porter & Miller (1985)
define this as 'differentiation'. In this way the organisation can attract a premium price
for its products or services. This unparalleled product or service is embodied in an
image for which customers will pay a premium. In the instance of differentiation,
Ward et al (1990) suggest that the emphasis here, is on innovation and creativity,
market-orientation and people-driven rather than systems-driven management controls.
IT will focus on enabling new things to be achieved or existing things to be done
better. IT will need to support each users need for information, implying high
overheads in development and operations. (i.e, value added, differentiated systems.)
By 'focus' Porter means targeting, and more specifically niche targeting. Porter
explains that focusing on a particular niche though, is not enough. It has to be
combined with a cost advantage or a unique customer value. Ward asserts that IT may
be a competitive weapon in considering a niche/focus strategy. Here IT can assist in
identifying and then establishing a strong hold on a particular niche.
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Figure 2.2 - Porter's Generic Strategy.
Ten years on, Porter (1996) maintains strategic positions emerge from three definite
sources.
III The first one he names as 'variety based positioning' being that it is based on the
choice of product or service offerings rather than customer segments.
3 The second basis for positioning he describes as 'needs based positioning' which is
about targeting a segment of customers.
• The third position, being 'access based positioning' is about targeting customers
Wh6 are accessible in different ways E.g. the geographical location of the
customer or the customer scale.
He further asserts that choosing Iiunioue position is not enough ~ocreate a sustainable
advantage over competitors. Many other factors need to be taken into account.
Whilst IT can be viewed as a definite source of advantage it needs to be viewed in
corjunction with other factors and resources. (Booth & Phillip, 1996.)
As all strategies rely on good information, managements, in their endeavour to
reposition their organisations, have turned to technology to further enhance their
strategies. Technology has been seen as a key enabler (Ventkatraman 199]) of
strategy. Using technology to enable strategy has however initiated another set of
challenges for organisations. These will be detailed in section 2.2.4.
2.2.3 Value Disciplines
The work of Treacy and Wiersema (1995) provides a framework for the research in
terms of assessing the type of strategic direction organisations are adopting. Treacy
and Wiersema's theory is that strategy thinking, has moved from being industry or
product driven to being customer driven. It is the customer who now rules. Customer
choices are what is now driving organisations to rethink their strategies. Treacy and
Wiersema advocate that a company can only succeed by excelling at providing a single
type of value to their customers. They have named this a 'value discipline' and submit
that organisations should build their entire strategy and operations around the chosen
value di xipline.
With market leadership being increasingly hard to win and to keep, with customers
being more demanding and less loyal than ever, they suggest a new model of
competitive strategy to assist managers in redefining their businesses. The have
categorised them into three different categories: operational excellence, customer
intimacy and product leadership. Their definition is as follows:
"By operational excellence, we mean providing
customers with reliable products or services at
competitive prices, delivered with minimal difficulty or
inconvenience. By product leadership, we mean
providing products that continually redefine the state of
the art. And by customer intimacy, we mean selling the
customer a total solution, not just a product or a
service. "
In choosing a value discipline the operating model of the organisation will have to
change to suit the value discipline, and together, this will define the nature of the
company. They further assert that these operating models are made up of operating
processes, business structures, management systems and a company culture all of
which together create a specific superior value. Different value disciplines demand
differing operating processes. The following three sections elaborate on each
discipline:
2.2.3.1 Operational Excellence
The focus of operationally excellent companies is on delivering quality, price and ease
of purchase that is unsurpassed. These companies reject variety because it has cost
implications and it is their intention to keep their prices consistently low. They also
place emphasis on convenience.
Efficient operating procedures are the backbone of these companies. They work at
shaping their customers' expectations. They strive for low overhead, with efficient re-
engineered business processes,
To sustain operational excellence these companies look for one target, and this is
growth. They look for a steady volume of business, they look for new ways to use
their existing assets and finally they try and duplicate this formula in other markets.
2.2.3.2 Produe; leadership
Product leaders offer their customers the best product. They consistently strive to
provide their markets with leading edge products or a new use for an existing product
or service. In so doing these organisations need to focus on creativity,
commercialisation of their ideas, and speed. These organisations value the innovation
process and avoid bureaucracy because it slows down the commercialisation process.
Their strength lies in reacting to situations as they occur.
The features of a product leader operating model include a focus on the core process
of invention, product development and market exploitation. The business structure
needs to be loosely knit, ad-hoc and ever changing to adjust to entrepreneurial
initiatives and their management systems should be re. ,1ts driven, that measure and
reward new product success. It should have a culture that encourages individual
imagination and accomplishment.
To be product leaders Treacy and Wiersema contend that companies have to show that
they can create a steady stream of standout products. Product leaders create flexible
organisational structures and robust processes. They provide efficient co-ordination
while embracing innovation and discipline
2.2.3.3 Customer Intimacy:
Companies delivering value via customer intimacy focus on providing a total solution
for the customer. These companies' greatest asset is their customers loyalty. They
cultivate relationships with their customers and concentrate on customer retention.
The operating model that supports such organisations allows them to deliver a' much
broader and deeper level of support. They tailor their mix of services or customise the
products for their customers. These organisations focus on core processes that deliver
solutions for their customers, have a business structure that delegates decision making
to employees who are closer to the customer, have management systems that are
geared towards creating results for carefully selected and nurtured clients and have a
culture that embraces specific rather than general solutions. These organisations strive
for deep and lasting relationships with their clients.
Customer intimate companies personalise basic services and even customise products
to meet unique customer needs. They take on the responsibility for achieving results
with their customers. They do not sell products at the leading edge. Their business
depends on a stream of products that represent evolutionary improvement, net
revolutionary change. They steer clear of pure transactions. If customers do not
require advice or expertise, customers wont find the customer intimate company's
offering compelling.
Clients need to meet a certain criteria in customer intimate companies:
.. attitude - does the client see an opportunity for joint gain?
Ie operation - where expertise meets with incompetence.
• financial - fit occurs where customers have large untapped potential.
In short, customer intimate companies continually deepen their client's dependence on
them. Solutions are what these companies sell
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Figure 2.3 - A diagrammatic representation of 'Value Disciplines' as put forward by
Treacy and Wiersema.
2.3 Organisational Transformation Models
The overwhelming volume of literature and research into the changing world of
business and the implications for organisations bears testimony to the fact that
companies are grappling with the constant and unpredictable changes in their markets.
Lloyd (1994) states that IT is not a competitive weapon, it is an enabler of business
transformation and a re-deflner of busin.ss scope. Organisations trying to change to
align 'with their new business strategies have adopted various methods - from re-
engineering and core competencies, to a focus on organisational capabilities. They are
looking internally and externally in their attempt to re-define their strategies and make
them operational. The following transformational efforts are being undertaken,
amongst others:
2.3.1 Business Process Re-engineereng
Whilst it has long been recognised that business process re-engineering (BPR) is not a
substitute for strategy (Rigby, 1993), BPR is being leveraged as part of an
organisation's strategy. Hammer and Champy (1995) define BPR as:
"the fundamental rethinking and radical redesign of
business processes to achieve dramatic improvements
in critical, contemporary measures of performance,
such as cost, quality. service and speed. "
The fundamental rethinking and redesign of processes create similar kinds of changes
in most organisations. Hammer submits that firstly, work units change from functional
departments to proce ss teams, where groups of people working together perform an
entire process, The second change that BPR brings about is that job designs change -
workers have ~o think of a far bigger picture, instead of just the task they used to
perform. Third;y, people's roles change, from being in a controlled environment, to
being empowered. Within the boundaries of their job specifications, the workers
should be deciding about the outcome of the process. The fourth change brought
about by BPR is that if employees are to be empowered to make decisions, then that
will have an impact of the skills level of the people. Hammer suggests that the focus
should shift from training, to education of the workforce. Another change, the fifth
one he cites, is that there should be a shift in performance measurements and
compensation from activity to results. Related to this, the sixth change, is that
advancement criteria ch..mges from performance to ability. In the aftermath of
reengineering, he states, the distinction between advancement and performance is
firmly drawn. Le. pay for perforrmnce and promote for ability. The seventh change
relates to people changing fr im being protective about their functions, (work) to being
productive, Managers change from being supervisors to coaches, organisational
structures dw"ge from being hierarchical to flat, and lastly, executives change from
being scorekeepers to leaders.
The changes +h& r; It.llgim.cring bi ings about requires lea ~ership with real vision. Re-
engineering ",.IS cannot be thougnt of as the solution, It should be integral to an
organisation's vision. Davenport ard Short (1990) take a more conservative view of
BPR. Whilst Hammer considers IT ,\5 the key enabler of BPR, Davenport and Short
argue that BPR requires taking a broader view of both IT and business activity and the
relationships between them. In their view, IT capabilities should support business
processes and business processes should be seen in terms of the capabilities IT can
provide. Thus their view, that BPR is ~he analysis and design of workflows, and
processes in an organisation and between organisatlons.
King's (1994) viewpoin' on the failure ofBPR is that there is an over emphasis on the
tactical aspects and therefore that the .trategic dimensions get compromised. He notes
that most failures of reengineering are attributable to the process being viewed and
applied at a tactical rather than a strategic level.
2.3.2 Core Competencies
Another of the transformation practices suggest that, in order for organisations to deal
with the ever changing business environment and increased global competition, is that
they focus on core compentencies of the organisation. Prahalad and Hammel (1990)
contend that:
"the real Sources oj advantage are to be found in
management's ability to consolidate corporatewide
technologies and production skills into competencies
that empower individuai businesses to adapt quickly to
changing opportunities."
Prahalad further suggests that organisations are missing the strength of competitors by
looking only at their end products. Of paramount importance is the collective learning
of the organisation. Fundamental to the concept of core competence is
communication, involvement and commitment to working across organisational
boundaries. He uses three tests to identity core competencies in a company: Firstly, a
core competence provides potential access to a wide variety of markets, secondly, a
core competence should make a significant contribution to the perceived customer
benefits or of the end product and thirdly, a core competence should be difficult for
competitors to imitate
Prahalad and Hammel argue against outsourcing, suggesting that these organisations in
an attempt to focus on core competencies have unwittingly surrendered them.
Outsourcing contributes little to building the people.
If a firm's core capabilities are scarce, durable, defensible or hard to imitate they can
form the basis for competitive advantage. (Schoemaker, 1992). He suggests that the
following characteristics help define a core competence - if it evolved slowing through
collective learning and information sharing, if its development could not be speeded up
by increasing investments, if it could not be· easily imitated or transferred to other
firms, and finally, if in the eye of the customer, it confers competitive advantage.
Parker (1996) also contends that core competencies and learning organisations cannot
succeed where the IT function cannot deliver and disperse information and shared
knowledge throughout the organisation. It follows then, that companies need to take
cognisance of technology and make it a core. competence if these organisations are
going to succeed well into the next millennium.
Leading on from this, literature points to capabilities (also known as the resource based
view of strategy) as being a key enabler of transformation in an organisation.
2.3.3 Comp13ting on Capabilities - Resource Based View
the key to strategy and to competitive advantage used to be the positioning of the
company as defined by Porter. However, in the more dynamic business world of today
strategy needs to be more dynamic - success depends on anticipating trends and a
speedy response to customer needs. Stalk et a' .,2) suggests that the essence of
strategy is not the structure ofa company's prodi ... and markets, but the dynamics of
behaviour. The goal here then, is to identify and develop the hard-to-imitate
organisational capabilities that distiaguish a company from its competitors in the eyes
of tne customer.
Stalk et al (1992) identify four basic principles of capabilities based competition: the
first being, that the building blocks of corporate strategy are business processes and not
products and markets, the second being that competiti te success depends on
transforming a company's key processes into strategic capabilities that consistently
provide superior value to the customer; thirdly, capabilities are created by making
strategic investments into a support infrastructure that links together and transcends
traditional strategic business units and functions, and lastly, the champion of
capabilities-based strategy should be the CEO because capabilities cross functions,
Thus it can be said that capabilities are sets of business processes strategically
understood. The primary objective of strategy should then be the business processes.
The key to transforming business processes is to link them to real customer needs.
'When the process begins and ends with the customer, then it is seen as a capability.
StpJk submits five dimensions where capabilities based organisations will outperform
their competitors: the time it takes to respond (speed), where the product or service is
unfailingly the same (consistency), where the company can anticipat '~e1ivery),how
adaptive the company is ("g.Uity) and lastly, the stream of new ideas (L ..vativeness).
The starting point in becoming a capabilitie- oased organisation is for senior =mgers
to undergo a fundamental shift in perception so that they see their business in terms of
strategic capabilities. From this they should focus on business processes and lirking
them to customer needs. Finally, they can then reshape the organisation - including
roles and responsibilities to encourage new kinds of behaviour. fhis can be the
formula to make them into a capabilities based competitor.
The four steps which a company can use to transform itself include shifting the
strategic framework to achieve aggressive goals, organising around the chosen
capability (i.e. making sure employees have the necessary skills and resources), making
progress visible and bringing measurements and reward into alignment and lastly, not
delegating the leadership of transformation.
Grant (1991) asserts firstly, that internal resources and capabilities provide basic
direction for a firm's strategy, and secondly that resources and capabilities are the
primary source of profit for the firm. His focus on resources includes financial
resources, physical resources, human resources, technological resources, reputation
and organisational resources. He states that
"the capabilities of a firm are what it can do as a result
of teams working together ..... .11 capability is, it, essence,
a routine or a number of interacting routines. "
Thus resources and capabilities are central to formulating strategies. In utiiising IT to
support a strategy it will become apparent that both competencies and capabilities
within an organisation. will form part of the plan to reshape the organisation. Thus it
can be deduced that large scale implementation of software packages cannot be
successful without due consideration to competencies and capabilities.
2.4 INFORMATION ARCHITECTURE
Many organisations have found that it is their information systems that have teen
inflexible and unable to meei their changing needs quickly, instead of it being the
organisation's vision that was not properly communicated. Allen et al. (1993) suggest
that in the past, information systems (IS) efforts have automated processes having
frozen the organisation into patterns of behaviour and operations that have resisted
change. Thus the challenge for the company is to structure IS to meet the changing
requirements of the organisation. A succinct definition of an information architecture
has been given by Brancheau and Wetherbe (1987) who define an information
architecture as
Ita high level map of the information requirements of all
organisation. It shows how major information categories
relate to business processes and how information
categories must be interconnected to support the business.
All information architecture provides the guide for
applications development. It facilitates the integration and
sharing oj data among applications. "
Information architecture will be investigated as it is key to the success of software
package implementations and the role these packages play in assisting with
transforming the organisation.
By information architecture is meant not only the hardware but also the data, human
resources, communications facilities, software and management responsibilities.
According to King (1995) an information architecture is a strategic capabilities
architecture because it is
"a flexible, adaptable and continuously improving
infrastructure of capabilities that is intended to keep a
firm competitive and allow it to achieve its multiple
goals. "
Many organisations have incompatible technologies directly attributable to their efforts
to stay at the forefront of technology and attempts at trying to meet business needs.
This has compounded the problems of' needing to integrate data and processes io be
more efficient and flexible. This is supported by Segars and Grover (1996) ..vho make
the point that the effective utilisation ofIT can only be achieved by carefully evaluating
organisational needs and only then matching them to technology solutions.
Segars and Grover propose a framework which assists in conceptualising higher-level
planning processes which are designed to assist in aligning IT with the business.
Enterprise
Model
Implementation
': of '
Netwcrl:s
ApplicJlions
Systems
Database
\'v
Figure 2.4 - Information Systems Architecture Framework. Source: Segars and
Grover 1996.
According to Segars and Grover Information Systems Architecture (ISA) development
starts with a broad conceptual level analysis of the business and proceeds to a more
specific level of logical systems analysis and then physical systems implementation. At
each level there is a different planning process, from which emerges a 'different
product.' Each step is gone through until a physical system emerges. All aspects of'TI'
must be taken into consideration. At the end of this there should be four sub-
architectures, being data, communications, technology anu applications.
2.4.1 Conceptual Level:
At this level the development aspects of an 1St'. should be seen from a strategic point
of'view, Top management's view should be taken into account at this level. The goal
should be to transform the vision into a set of concrete strategies for the development
of an informatica architecture. Considerations should include the structure of the
organisation, processes and f'olicies.
Risks at this level include having no strategic direction ( either not communicated or
there is no plan), a lack of ongoing strategic assessments and a lack of skills and
methodologies to undertake this analysis.
:2.4.2 Ll!Jlgicallevel;
There should be a more tactical perspective at this level. Middle management's point
of view should he taken into account here. This level of architecture development
should be concerned with matching information requirements with the functions,
processes and tasks within the organisation. From here the ISA provides a blueprint
for more specific conceptualisations of data flow, applications usage and processing
needs across the enterprise. This can be divided into four clear process areas: a
communications architecture for movement of information, an applications architecture
for the distribution of software, a technology architecture for the distribution of
hardware ane a data architecture for the distribution of information.
Risks at this level are numerous: they include the amount of databases, business
processes and information requirements which can be overwhelming; retaining the
status quo instead of being more responsive to changes in the competitive
environment; and the lack of skills and methodologies to undertake such an analysis,
which could jeopardise the process.
2.4.3 Physical level:
This level of the architectural process is concerned with the implementation and
development of databases, networks, hardware and software applications. The notion
of an overall ISA guides the integration and implementation of other systems risks.
These risks includ c political game playing, the temptation to avoid replacing 'tried and
true' systems and a misunderstanding of the implementation plans.
Clearly information architectures are central to an organisation's strategy if IT is being
leveraged to underpin their strategy. Without an information architecture then,
organisations put their IT enabled strategies at risk.
2.5 SOFTWARE PACKA~ES
The biggest advantage of purchasing software, is that it pravides economies of scale.
This is especially important in the South Africa., context where there is a critical
shortage of IT skills. This option offers a clear advantage to South African
organisations in that the time scale to implement such software is less than the time it
takes to develop such systems. The interest in packaged software, does however go
beyond just an economies of scale issue; another important factor is that packages can
assist the organisation in achieving integration of function and data. By implementing
a package the organisation is forced to investigate its business processes, to best make
a fit to the software.flravenport 1990). The importance of processes to software
packages is set out in section 2.4.1.
Software provides the mechanism through which managers can lower costs and
compress time cycles. Software is also the core element in creating the functionalities
that make products valuable to customers ~ it is often the strategic element in
unlocking higher value-added opportunities and in restructuring entire co.npanies and
industries. (Quinn et al 1996) These integrated ERP pCi·•cages cover a variety of
functional modules, including general accounting, distribution, logistics, manufacturing
and human resources. Examples of such packages include SAP R3, Baan, Triton,
Peoplesoft, Oracle and JD Edwards.
As such, software packages then provide organisations with solutions to their business
problems. A software package needs to accommodate user and industry dynamics.
Organisations are looking at software packages to provide the flexibility they require,
to promote efficient work and data flow, and ease of use.
The key Sl!CCeSS of software implementations rests not with the mere deployment of
these packages, but rather to leverage them to obtain the benefits sought to support the
organisation's strategic direction. In these instances organisations seek to redesign
their business to exploit software packages. To implement such large scale systems
requires decisions about priorities within an organisation because of the
interdependencies of the various functions from a business and systems point of view.
(Rockart & Short, 1989) This forces a focus on the process behind the work being
done or the product. Where IT is seen as the tool for changing business (Davenport,
1990) processes become the building blocks of the changed direction.
Organisations adopt two kinds of approaches to implementing such software. The first
approach is to implement the software incrementally. (i.e. divide a large project into a
number of smaller projects.) The second approach is known as the 'Big Bang'
approach, which is an all-at-once approach.
Subramanian & Lacity (1997) point out that there are three types of incremental
implementations. The first type of incremental implementation, protoyping, is where
the system is developed in an artificial environment so that users can test and validate
the new system. The second type, phasing, allows for large projects to be divided into
a number of phases, with each phase being implemented at a different stage. The third
type, piloting, is where the system is developed at one site. This site is used as the test
site and when the system is complete, it gets roUed out to other sites.
Circumstances may not allow for the incremental approach, in which case, the 'Big
Bang' approach is used. Literature points to the fact that a number of organisations
prefer this method. Forrester's Cameron (cited by Radosevich, 1997) agrees, "if a
company has a flat organisational structure that is not tightly controlled, it's very
difficult to sustain commitment." Radosevich, describing an ERP implementation at
Quantum (California) states that their reasons for using this approach was that they
needed to integrate their business quickly and they did not want tc write and test
custom interfaces, (which is normally necessary with the incremental approach.).
2.5 -: Processes
Davenport and Short (1990) highlight a number of means by which IT can support a
business objecti ve: where IT assists in human labour and produces a more structured
process, (automational), where IT augments the automation process and provides
information for analysis, (informational), where IT changes the sequences of processes
so that processes can be performed concurrently and not sequentially, (sequential); IT
can assist with monitoring and tracking of a process, (tracking); it can facilitate in
incorporating more data to be aralysed and reduce time, (analytical); IT can overcome
geographical locations, (geographical); IT does away with highly segmented tasks,
(integrative); IT can facilitate the distribution of knowledge more broadly and
corsistently, (intellectual); and lastly, -.IT can connect participants in the process and
this he names 'disintermediating'.
Davenport further draws attention to the fact that business should be viewed not in
terms of functions, divisions or products, but as key processes. He defines a process
as
"a specific ordering of work activities across time and
place, with a beginning, an end, and clearly defined inputs
and outputs: a structurefor action. "
A focus on processes allows companies to integrate functionally separated tasks into
unified horizontal work processes. (Garvin, 1995; Quinn, 1996). Thir 'n turn facilitates
new ways of working. P.Allaire CEO of Xerox (cited by Garvin) states that less
developed information systems that supported command-and-control structures could
not support today's changing business requirements - such as accessing information
simultaneously from multiple locations. Software packages force a thinking about
where processes intersect. Alignment across the business is critical if technology is to
be leveraged.
Before a package can be implemented an investigation into existing processes is
required. For example, " .aat the process does, how well it performs, and knowing of
the issues surrounding its performance. (Davenport 1990). Understanding the process
and its output, can lead to an improved precess. Hammer & Champy (1995) relate
that the goal in undersr- nding the process is not understanding the 'how', but the
'what' and the 'why', Lt;;;CaUseto obtain a new process the concentration will be on
what the new process will do. From here then, a re-engineering exercise can take
place, and then it cen be applied to the new software package. Thus, the software
forces an understanding of what is critical to the performance of that process (i.e. what
the real objective of the process is) and then the new process should be applied to the
software.
For software packages and new business processes to have a positive impact on the
organisation depends on the Information management structure of the organisation.
According to Davenport (1990) information and technology are rarely sufficient to
bring about process changes and successful implementations of software;
organisational structures and culture contribute largely to the success or failure
thereof
2.5.2 Organisational Values
Amongst the values that tills review will consider are teamwork, employee
empowerment and factors relating to human resources.
2.5.2.1 Teams
If IT fundamentally alters what knowledge is useful, where that knowledge is located,
who has access- to it and how it gets increased and applied (Clark, 1989; Drucker,
1988), then the changes that it brings to the organisation are connected to the people
that drive these systems. If organisations then, shift their focus tram individual tasks to
processes, teams will be involved in performing these processes. (Wetlaufer 1994,
Rockart and Short, 1989). According to Savage, (1996) reengineering of key
processes, does not, in itself, assist an organisation to move to team-working. He
further states that real integration is people dependent. Thus, integration is more
dependent on the values of the organisation and the integrity of people than on the
quality of the computer.
Teams facilitate a broader range of skills than any individual. Teams facilitate
functional interfaces and parallel activities. Teams also benefit from improved quality
of work life as there is a socialization added to the work done - workers do not feel
alienated. Key to the success of the team are personality issues, performance
evaluation and incentives, together with process activities.(Davenport and Short, 1990;
Kiernan, 1997;).
2.5.2.2 Empowerment
The integrated nature of software packages and the focus on processes, allows for the
empowerment of employees. As Allaire, ( cited by Garvin, 1995) indicates, if
employees control the processes, then they know how the organisation is working.
This empowerment drives changes in the structure of the organisation. Benjamin et al.
(1992) make the point that the locus of knowledge and hence power in the
organisation changes where a large scale package is being sought as. an enabler of
change in the organisation
Attaran (1996) suggests that this empowerment results in direction coming from the
top management of the organisation and not from decision making. Companies will
need to reorganize their infrastructures and responsibilities to support the role of IT
within the organisation.
If empowerment is driven by new technologies then organisations must be prepared to
support the increasing appetite for information. (Davenport et al., 1994). Together
with new processes, new IT and new empowerment, emerges a requirement for new
skills. This could be as a result of a broader set of work tasks - which might involve
cross-training in business functions and also skills to use the new technologies.
Software packages introduce into an organisation the potential to attack as Ciborra
(1994) describes, the 'competency gap' - by allowing new competencies to emerge and
consolidate. He describes it as a process of radical learning which entails restructuring
the perceptions and organisational backgrounds that give meaning to processes and
skills at hand. Software packages, because of their 'tailorability' encourage employees
to experiment with their systems. (This is particularly valuable if a stand alone test
system is available to employees.) Ciborra suggests that from this, innovation can be
achieved. Software applications open new horizons as to how things can be done.
2.5.2.3 Human Resources
To harness these applications, either new skills will have to be learned, or new skills
will have to he bought in By their very nature, cross-functional processes imply a
variety of skills which in itself demands more effort from the employee. Therefore a
broader view of employee training and development should be fostered within the
organisation. (Ghoshal & Bartlett, 1995). The applicability of this will be of special
interest to the South African situation which faces a particular challenge in terms of
skills levels. (Meyer, 1996).
According to Strebel (1996) it is unrealistic for managers to expect employees to buy
into changes that alter the status quo. He maintains that unless organisations redefine
their employees' commitments to new goals, employees will remain skeptical of the
change initiative and distrustful of management. Kotter (1995) agrees. He believes
performance measurements and incentive schemes need to be put in place so that
employees put the new vision ahead of their own self interest. This is of significance to
large scale implementations as such implementations bring about large scale changes
within an organisation.
2.5.3 Risks
The implementation of a new strategy in an organisation, together with a new
information system to support it, is inherently a high risk strategy. Ward et at (1990)
maintain that new technologies and new software products should only be adopted
where there are major functionality improvements which cannot be met by the
organisation's existing environment; when significant lcnger term cost savings can be
assured; and lastly when the system can deliver better long term options. Ward points
out that the key risk is not achieving the expected advantage or business objective.
Literature points to a number of successful and failed software implementations.
(Radosevich and Dahle, 1996; Drummond, 1996;)
According to Fiedler et a1. (1994) organisational risk is always present with
organisational change - if the change is such that it precludes running old and new
systems in parallel then there is increased risk with an 'all-or-nothing' approach.
Associated with organisational risk is what Fiedler et al. define as process risk - i.e. the
irreversibility of change process, resistance to change and task ambiguity. In addition
they highlight structural risk which represents risks associated with crossing traditional
functional boundaries and altering existing organisational structures - i.e. risks
associated with structural change, increased structural complexity, and limited
ownership of the process. This emphasises the need for top managements commitment
to the project. Given that large scale software packages are being utilised to assist in
the transformation of the organisation, risk evaluation and risk management should be
high on the agenda of the overall strategy. Lauer (1996) draws attention to studies
(citing Rothfeder, 1988 and Simmons et al., 1993) which state that a distinction needs
to be drawn between such projects that fail managerially and not technologically. For
example. where project managers are presented with an uncertain flow of resources
and with conflicting objectives.
As BPR is fundamental to the implementation of ERP packages, there are risks
attached to the business process redesign. Mumford (1996) contends that as society
bas moved from "the 'industrial age' into the 'risk age' managers are being asked to
take new risks with which they are unfamiliar. She makes the point that today's risks
(especially those risks stemming from new ideas like BPR) are that they are not
known. Whilst managers are used to handling certain kinds of risk, these have usually
been of a financial nature, with which they have been most familiar. Often
organisation's enter into the risk of BPR to avoid the larger risk of an inability of
competing in new markets.
Another risk which needs to be managed is the risk of timing. Charette (1996)
highlights the time to implement and the resources required to implement, as high risk.
Careful consideration needs to be given to these areas so as not to jeopardise the
project and the organisation. E.g. A time frame of 6 months to implement where
experience has shown that it has never been done in less than a year will put the project
at risk.
High on the list of risks is the selection of software packages, where the selection
methodology has not been rigorous enough - both with functional fit and with vendor
selection. (Hecht, 1997; Dixon, 1989).
The change required within an organisation implementing such large scale packages, if
not managed correctly, can lead to failed implementations. (Kotter, 1995; Attaran,
1996; Ghoshal & Bartlett, ·995; Legare, 1995; Yetton et al., 1994; Sankar, 1991;
Edwards & Pepper, 1994.). Management needs to be watchful of the response of
employees, the new learning process, the political environment, the objectives and the
structures of the organisation so that each can be incorporated into the new vision and
implementation of software.
Just as there is a risk with overlaying the new software over old processes (Davenport,
1994), customising the software to make company specific changes, introduces another
element of risk. Customisation wipes out cost savings and prevents companies from
taking up new release of software as they are made available by the vendor. (Dean et
al, 1994).
2.5.4 Critical Success Factors
Closely related to risks in implementing large scale software packages, are critical
success factors (eSP's) which should receive constant attention from the management
of the organisation undertaking such a project. Rockart's (1979) work on critical
success factors provides a methodology to identify objectives and critical areas without
detailed development plans. Rockart defines CSF's as being
"for an)! business, the limited number of areas in which
results, if they are satisfactory, will ensure competitive
performance for the organisation They are the few key
areas where 'things must go right I for the business to
flourish. "
Critical success factors then, support the attainment of organisational goals. eSF's can
pertain to a particular industry, company, business unit or manager. Ward et at (1990)
suggest that CSF's relating to information systems should only be identified once the
stated objectives of the organisation are consolidated. Once CSF's have been
identified, only then, should the IS or package be considered. This section will detail
some of the CSF's which pertain to software implementation and their importance to
the overall success of'the project and the organisations strategy.
Undeniably, change management will top the list of critical success factors when
utilising large scale packages as transformational agents. A project (If this magnitude
requires leaders in senior-level jobs. Sankar draws attention to five domains within an
organisation where change takes place. The first area, is the behavioural domain,
where the response of people within the organisation can have huge impacts. The
second area, the technical domain, impacts because of the changed worktlows and job
functions as a result of the technology and applications. Thirdly, the process domain,
where the balance of power within the organisation is impacted and fourthly, in
management systems, where the political environment of the organisation can be
challenged. The last area, the structural domain, is where software applications can
contribute to flattened organisational structures and therefore will require attention.
Change management, in itself being a <. r.zad SUbject, cannot be included in this
research, except that it should be considered critical to the success of an ERP
implementation.
Top management commitment is also considered to be critical to the success of ERP
implementations, (premkumar & King, 1992). Additional to this is a project sponsor
or champion for the new system. (Beath, 1991). According to Beath
"championsare more than ordinary leaders; the}'are more
like transformational leaders who inspire others to
transcend self-interest/or a higher collective purpose. "
Literature also refers to the following as critical to the implementation of ERP
systems:
" User involvement
• Reengineering to fit the software
• Communication
• Realistic deadlines
It Re-skilling of'people
Whilst this list is not comprehensive it is not the intention of this research to
investigate implementation methodologies, merely to point out that there are a number
of factors that inhibit the success of such projects.
2.6 Summary
The literature points to the significance of'a number of strategies that organisavons are
employing in their bid 1.0 align their information technologies so that these
organisations can either c.Hain or sustain competitive advantage. It is cle., that a
complex web of issues contribute to the success of such projects. What is key is that
iaformation technology is the enabler of such strategies if the technology is correctly
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deployed .. Porter (1996) points out that the essence of strategy is in choosing to
perform activities differently from what rivals do. Consequently, it is not the
technology that matters, but how the technology is used.
In this chapter Porter's Five Forces Model, Porter's Generic Strategies and Treacy and
Wiersema's Value Disciplines were presented. A number of organisational
transformation models, togethe vith literature relating to Information Systems
Architecture and software package. "ere also outlined. In the following chapter, the
research method will be detailed. This will include the framework as put forward by
Segars and Grover (1996), together with the organisational transformation models as
summarised in this chapter.
CHAPTER 3
3.0 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
The purpose of this chapter is to demonstrate the research method employed. The
framework as proposed by Segars and Grover (1996), together with a number of
organisational transformation models were utilized, in conjunction with the case study
approach. This chapter also details the research sample.
3.1 INTRODUCTiON
The central theme of this research is whether organisations are utilising software packages
in their bid to transform their organisations to compete better in the changing world of
business. To this end an analysis of the impact of iraormation technology software
architecture on business transformation strategy was undertaken. Integrated enterprise
resource planning (ERP) software, which was traditionally designed to support labour-
intensive back-office functions is now increasing in significance from the back office to the
boardroom. (Hecht, i997). Hecht attributes this shift to the globalisation of business and
the evolution in technical architecture. To support his view he cites Cundiff as stating
"a significant shift in the business models from
hierarchical, line-of-business-oriented activities to more
process-driven models is motivating a re-examination oj
enterprise application software. Combining the influences
of RPR with downsizing and acquisition, a new stage has
been set that alters the role oj ERP applications. "
In assessing how ERP packages are being used strategically to assist in the changed
directions of organisations, the framework as put forward by Segars and Grover (1996),
together with the organisational transforma.'on models as set out in Chapter two, will be
employed in conjunction with the case study approach ..
3.2 THE RESEARCH METHOD
The research l..~~hodology used for the purpose of data collection is in the form of
multiple case studies. Yin (1994) argues that a case study is a preferred method of
research in examining contemporary events. Methods employed in collecting the data are
by direct observation, open ended interviews, organisational documentation, and
participant observation. Yin defines a case study as
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"an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary
phenomenon within its real-life context, especially when the
boundaries between Thephenomenon and context are 110t
clearly evident. "
Yin further maintains that case studies have U erstinctive place in evaluation research, the
most important of which for the purpose of this study, is to explain the causal links in real-
life interventions that are too complex for a surveyor for experimental strategies In this
instance the case study method will be used to explore those situations in which the
interventions being evaluated have no clear, single set of outcomes.
The objective in using multiple case studies was to establish if organisations in e» nl',vrng
the same software architecture, within different strategic specialities are achieving their
anticipated benefits.
3.3 THE FRAMEWORK
The framework as put forward by Segars and Grover (1996) provides a foundation for the
research primarily because it proposes an approach which is top-down and encompasses
organisational IT requirements rather than focusing on requests of managers and end-
users. Segars and Grover assert that:
"Conceptually, ISA (Information Systems Architecture)
structures the strategic objectives of the enterprise, models
the entire business in terms oj its junctions. processes or
tasks, and relate: them to the information required f(lr
successful performance. Ideally, ISA should meet the
strategic and information needs of the organisation with
minimal redundancy in data flow, processing and storage. "
As shown in Figure 3.1 the framework starts with the conceptual level, which comprises
an analysis of the business. The framework then proceeds to the logical level, where the
matching ofinfonnation requirements with functions, processes and tasks take place. The
last level, the physical level, involves the systems implementation.
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3.3.1 The Conceptual Level
At this level the perspectives are those of top management. That is, the perspective is
strategic. The objective of this level of analysis is to understand, communicate and
represent the strategic direction of the organisation. At this level the vision of the
organisation needs to be transformed into a concrete set of strategies vis-a-vis the new IS
development. The issues at this level include uncovering how the business operates,
where the business is going, and when it should get there.
Resulting from this analysis, should be a set of models which capture the strategic and
tac.ical infonnation about the business, the competitive approach and the organisational
structure. These models should then build consensus regarding the requirements of the
intended new IS. This should foster alignment between organisational strategy and the
objectives of IS. This level of analysis helps establish the roles and responsibilities of each
business and functional unit, and support the reengineering effort required within the
organisation.
3.3.2 The logical Level
At this level the perspectives of middle management are taken into account. This level of
architecture development is concerned with matching information requirements with the
functions, processes and tasks identified in the conceptuallevel, It is at this level that the
effective restructuring of organisational processes takes place. Segars and Grover (1996)
contend that a major planning product of this level of analysis is the Information
Architecture. The Information Architecture then, includes personnel, organisational and
technology profiles. (A number of profiles relating to this level, and not expanded on by
Segars and Grover, will be dealt with in section 3.3.4.) Theses profiles show how
information categories must be interconnected to facilitate support for decision makers.
(Brancheau and Wetherbe, 1986.)
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The Information Architecture provides a blueprint for developing more specific
conceptualisations of data usage. data flow, applications usage and processing needs
across the organisation. Segars and Grover propose that four. sub-architectures (being
communications, applications, technology and data) provide greater detail concerning the
use of information and information technologies within the organisation.
The Communications Architecture provides a conceptualisation of how information flows
throughout the organisation (i.e, these communication links inter-connect organisations,
people and machines.) The Applications Architecture documents existing and required
applications necessary to support the processes within the organisation. The Technology
Arclutecture illustrates how processing technologies are distributed in support of
organisational processes. The Data Architecture is a blueprint of data created and used by
the various process of the organisation. Figure 3.2 depicts the various sub-architectures
within the logical systems design.
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Figure 3,2 - The logical systems design.
Information
The logical level takes the broad requirements of the organisation and categorises them,
into more specific architectures. This facilitates the detailed design of particular systems
and the setting of priorities for implementation.
3.3.3 The Physical Level
This level of the architectural process involves the actual implementation and development
of applications, databases, networks and systems, The guide in the implementation is the
overall ISA. The plans at this level are very detailed and take OIl the perspectives of
operations or project management.
The benefits to the organisation using this framework leads to the identification and
development of information resources integrated across the otganisation, It facilitates a
view of the organisation as is and how management would like it to be, It also facilitates
the allocation of scarce resources to those projects which are most critical to supporting
organisational needs. The development of the lSA provides the opportunity to rethink
current organisational processes and forges links between organisational and IS strategies.
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3.3.4 Extending the Framework
Expanding on the Segars and Grover (1996) Information Systems Architecture
framework, more specifically on the logical level within the framework are the following
important issues:
3.3.4.1 PmcessesfBusincss Process R.eengineeling
An analysis of the organisation at the logical level prompts an analysis of processes and
functions within the organisation. Hammer (1990) considers IT as the key enabler of BPR
which he views as radical. Davenport and Short (1990) submit that BPR requires taking a
broader view of both IT and the business. BPR then is primarily a business tool -
processes represent a new approach to analysing and co-ordinating: unctions within the
organisation. Davenport's viewpoint is that business should not be viewed in terms of
functions, divisions or products. This research will evaluate SPR as part of the framework
and as being pertinent to software applications.
3.3.4.2 Core Competencies
A core competence is a unique combination of technologies, knowledge and skills that are
possessed by the organisation. (Petts, 1997). This Resource-Based view suggests that it is
the intangible assets which are invisible to external observers and which are difficult to
analyse which provide the competitive advantage to the organisation. Core competence
has a number of attributes (i.e. complexity, invisibility, inimitability, durability,
appropriability, non-sustainability and superiority) which represent an organisations
sustainable competitive advantage. (Petts, 1997; Schoemaker, 1992) Petts suggests that
core competence is hidden from the customers perception. The customer demands the
tangible benefits that arise from the core competence's existence. Thus, the competence
becomes 'core' when it is linked to the customers needs. The ability to deploy a core
competence into customer benefits is known as 'core capability'.
3.3.4.3 Core Cap,1bility
According to Petts (1997) core capability extends from the hidden strengths of the
company as far as the perception of the customer. Petts presents a graphic idea (figure
3.3) as a means of depicting both core competence and core capability.
('cre Cop,bility
-----~-~----~--- ---I
I
Figure 3.3 ~The dimension of Core Capability ~ source Petts, 1997.
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Petts portrays core competence as the hid.len portion of core capability - the two concepts
are- inextricably linked, but are often confused 'with each other. Figure 3.3 shows the
dependency between the two concepts. Core capability then, only exists when it is driven
by a core competence.
Literature points to the fact that competitive advantage is now becoming the ability to
satisfy the customer needs with nroduct offerings that have been developed prior to
customers asking for them. (Petts, 1997) Petts suggests that basic competences can
develop into core; competences :f they reach the core capability chain at the right time.
The key to core capabilities is to invest in a supply of new ski~ls (e.g. individual skill,
technology, marketing, knowledge and resource usage.) Skills development then, is the
foundation for the building of a new core competence.
The building of a core capability then, also slots into the logical level of the ISA. Vlhilst
the identification of a core competence is usually identified at the conceptual level of the
ISA, capabilities building encompasses a middle management agenda.
3.4 THE RESEARCH SAMPLE
This research was limited to a sample offour organisations. They were selected to include
medium sized organisations each in a different kind of industry. Each of the four
organisations had redefined strategies and each were at a different stage in the
implementation of their projects.
In the next chapter, the four organisations will be presented. Each organisation will be
described in relation to their background, their perceived business problem, their planning
phases and the benefits they expected to derive from the implementation of enterprise
wide packaged software applications.
CHAPTER 4
4.1 Introduction
The four organisations evaluated for this study are each at different stages of the
implementation of their information systems chosen to assist in supporting their new
strategies. Mondi Cartonboard has just entered the cycle, where evaluation and resultant
decisions have taken place and preparation for implementation has begun. Castrol are
preparing to put their new information system into production by the end of 1997, having
been operational on the IDE financials for 10 months. Trident has been operational on their
system for six months, with financials in production for over a year. Johnson and Johnson,
operational on the system for 5 years has had the benefits of two large software upgrades. At
the beginning of each case study a diagram depicting the evolution of the IDE implementation
is presented. This diagram serves to point out that implementations of this nature are iterative
and depict where, in the cycle, each organisation is.
4.2 Mondi Cartonboard
Johnson
& Jomson
iliderrt
Figure 4.1 ~The evolution of the IDE implei ientation.
Castrol
4.2.1 Background·to the company:
Mondi, a 51% owned subsidiary of AMIC (Anglo American Industrial Corp. Ltd.), is a fully
integrated forestry products business which comprises six operating divisions. These include
Mondi Forests, Mondi Kraft, Mondi Paper, Mondi Cartonboard, Mondi Timber Products and
Paperlink, Together their annual turnover is $7 Billion. Mondi is one of the biggest pulp and
paper' makers in South Africa and also has several mills in Europe. Mondi is one of four
companies (together with Sappi, Nampak and Carlton Paper) which produces almost 98% of
national paper and board production. The balance is provided by a number of smaller
rmnufacturers.
Mondi Cartonboard, the focus of this case study, does a turnover of 500 million rands per
annum, small in comparison to other divisions Kraft and Paper, the largest, does a turnover
of2 billion rands and Forestry, a turnover of 1.3 billion rands. Mondi Cartonboard consists of
two branches, a mill in Springs and the Umgeni Mills. Over the past five years the
organisation has moved from a production push to a market pull strategy. As the business
strategy has changed, so it has expected the systems to follow. The organisation was looking
to a changed way of doing business as the organisation had not been profitable.
Cartonboard's focus was local and it had long been contending with beating prices of dumped
products.(That is where overseas organisations sell off prooucts at a lower price than they sell
in their own local rnarket.) This has resulted in Mondi Cartonboard being constantly in
reactive mode. To this end, Mondi underwent a process of evaluation to understand current
business needs and together with a re-defined strategy, a process to redefine their information
technology strategy with a view to supporting the new proposed business strategy.
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Figure 4.2 - Mondi Group Turnover.
4.2.2 The Problem
In the early 1990's Mondi Cartonboard lacked a clear strategic direction. The absence of a
formal business plan was largely due to a re-engineering exercise which had left the
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organisation with a top management structure which was new to the business. Thus the
business plan that had been in place was outdated and the new managers were not familiar
with the plan or had not bought into the plan
To support the business Mondi used an in-house developed system, which was modified to
suit each division's specific requirement. MIMICS (Mondi Integrated Manufacturing and
Inventory Control System) comprising of 2000 programs was developed in 1987 for
Merebank and Richards Bay. In 1990 it was installed at Mondi Cartonboard and modified
extensively to suite their requirements. Mimics was used for order entry, production
planning/deckling, production recording/quality control, warehouse control, despatch,
invoicing and sales analysis. Add-ens for product costing, raw materials usage and reel and
pallet tracking (for recording information on the finishing floor) were scheduled for
development or had been written to enhance system functionality.
For ·its financial reporting and controls, Mondi Cartonboard utilised the ID Edwards (IDE)
software, AIl other Mondi divisions utilised IDE except for Mondi Recycling who used
Accpacc and Merebank, who were in the process of implementing SAP R3. Whilst the Mondi
Group had purchased most of the IDE modules , Mondi Cartonboard was only using the
financial modules, and Mimics was being interfaced to the IDE system via the debtors module.
As a result the division was not obtaining maximum benefits from the system. (Refer figure
43)
Figure 43 - Information Systems currently ir, use at Mondi Cartonboard.
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Due to extensive modifications to the Mimics system, and pressure to develop changes
speedily, the system lacked stability. This had led to an unstable database and integrity
problems. Poor system knowledge and lack of user understanding had resulted in the
perception that Mimics did not adequately support the business requirements. This,
together with the fact that Mimics was originally developed from a production
perspective, and that the business had started moving to being market driven, Mimics fell
largely short in supporting marketing information requirements. Marketing informa.ion
was downloaded from Mimics into a Lotus 123 spreadsheet, which contained information
about production and logistics.
Each department within Mondi Cartonboard had its own system to analyse and report on data.
No standard systems were used by common departments within the division. This severely
impacted the organisation. No formal data architecture had been defined in the development
of departmental systems at each site. As outlined in the literature review, Segars and Grover
(1996) highlight that organisations have deployed incompatible technologies because of their
need to stay at the ferefront of technology and because of their attempts to meet ongoing
business needs.
Information systems operated in isolation from tre other business departments. In the
business departments users were catering for their C 'NIl IT needs and operating without the IT
department's consultation or involvement. In the past management had perceived the IT
department as not performing adequately and thus the IT department lacked credibility.
4.2.3 Tile Planning Phase
To this end, a team was established which comprised senior management of the organisation,
including the IT function, and external consultants from 'Ucisys. Their brief was to evaluate
current business practices and formulate an IT strategy to support the business over the next
three to five years. This assessment highlighted certain needs amongst which was the need for
detailed documented business analysis to solve the problems of business systems not fully
satisfying business needs.
4.2.3.1 Processes
A number of issues came to light during the investigation. The organisation was structured in
such a fashion that it was more functional than cross functional. Islands of information
existed, there was distrust of other's information, there were discrepancies in the information
and there was repetitive capture of data. Simple processes had been overcomplicated. (Refer
section 2.5.1.) There was a lack of training in both the business areas and systems areas of the
organisation. The lack of reliable information was hindering progress. The flat structures that
had been put in place due to a previous re-engineering effort was not supported by redesigned
job specifications, systems or practices, hence the low levels of motivation and low morale.
Added to this it was clear that resources were stretched. Processes were not optimised - they
were designed around business inefficiencies. SOMe processes were not clearly defined.
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4.2.3.2 CClC:Dabmties
An evaluation of IS knowledge and skills indicated that half of the IT department had been
with the organisation for less than a year. All IT staff had been in their current positions for
less than a year. This was attributed to the fact that job profiles change regularly and secondly
that new IT positions had recently been created. There were only two people in the
department who had extensive knowledge of current systems at Cartonboard. Of those two
people, only one person had an in-depth knowledge of all critical systems but this knowledge
was not formally documented. This was seen as a major risk.
Their approach was to investigate a number of alternatives. Retaining the present computer
systems environment was ruled out as it did not comply with Cartonboard's strategic business
objectives. Custom development or the rewriting of application systems was ruled out due to
the scarcity of computer skills and previous experiences at Cartonboard. It was estimated the
process of designing and constructing an information system required by the division would
take in excess of three years. The business could not afford such a delay in the
implementation of new systems. (Refer Section 2.3.3)
4.2.3.3 Software Applications
A package solution was also investigated, which was in line with the Mondi Group policy,
even though it required the greatest short term investment. However, in the long run it was
considered to be the most cost effective solution. Recent developments and trends had shown
that the available range of package solutions was the best way to address systems integration
and information requirements. Modem solutions have replaced the traditional interfaces
approach with a fully integrated approach whici, includes a development platform,
organisational re-engineering approaches and implementation methodologies. Whilst a
number of packaged solutions was compared (including SAP R3), it was emphasised that
Cartonboard had a substantial investment in hardware and applications experience relating to
IDE. The implementation of IDE would allow for the retention of a substantial portion of the
existing investment in hardware, software and the related skills at Cartonboard, and would
allow for a controlled phased migration to new technologies already catered for in the IDE
solution. (Figure 4.4 depicts the modules of IDE that Cartonboard intend implementing.)
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Figure 4.4 - Planned IDE Modules for Mondi Cartonboard.
4.2.3.4 Organisational Values
Given the substantial cost differential for similar functionality and the fact that a McFa
(1981) risk assessment for the system implementation of SAP and IDE had confirmed that
installation of a known quantity (IDE) would result in a lower risk proiect, the steel
committee voted unanimously to proceed with IDE. IDE provided the best business fit
Cartonboard at the most effective price due to the existing partial installation then
McFarlan identifies three dimensions that contribute to the uncertainty of the success
projects of this nature. The first dimension is the size of the project. Large projects
riskier than small ones. The second dimension is the experience with the technology. W]
the development team and users have experience with the technology and are knowledge;
in the application area, risk is reduced. The third dimension, project structure, where ris
reduced to the extent the application fits existing structure for performing the t".sks ar .
organisation demonstrates commitment to change.
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Mondi Cartonboard identified a number of critical success fa "which included top
management commitment, user ownership of the processes and 1. -mation systems that
would support those processes; professional project: management, a committed partnership
with IDE, available and committed process champions, realistic deadlines, and lastly,
applicable re-engineering to the business to match the package. The methodology of
identifying critical success factors, as advocated by Rockart (19'/9) and referred to in the
literature review in section 2.5.4, assists organisations in maintaining a focus on objectives
without being hindered by detailed plans.
4.2.4 Expected BSi1efl
Improved customer service was clearly an expected benefit as an enhanced system could
reduce order delivery lead 'times which currently stood at 25 days. Issues pertinent t'l the
customer, such as stock availability, order status, production and delivery schedules could be
provided accurately and timeously. At the same time relevant information could be fed
through to the marketing team in order for them to service the market.
There was the expectation that there would be improved reliability of customer service, in that
accurate forecasting and capacity planning could assist the division in achieving due date
performance and enable users to proactively manage deviations from the olan.
The organisation sought, through their improved systems, to minimise costs and improve
margins. Product consistency could be improved by implementing improved materials
handling and forecasting procedures. Logistics costs could be minimised by optimising
working capital and reducing distribution costs. Co::.t could also be contained by managing
the reduction of waste.
Tangible cost savings were based on the assumptions that an increase in machine optimisation
could be obtained through product rationalisation and improved planning. This would be
dependent on the new system supporting the shift from an order based to a product based
strategy.(i.e. the changed strategy was to manufacture to forecast for 80% of the bus'ness.
This represented a fundamental shift in the way they did business.) Cost savings would also
be attributed due to improved planning and timing of engineering maintenance. Another cost
saving could be obtained by a reduction in raw materials stocks resulting in a saving in interest
cost.
Intangible benefits included the improved and speeded up decision making pro: esses that
would eventuate from an on-line real-time integrated system. Current batch processing bottle
necks would be done away with. Management, personnel, suppliers and customers would feel
the benefit of this system.
The investment in the latest technology and software applications would result in uplifting the
skills base within the organisation. As such a system results in a large investment in training.
The organisation viewed this as buiknng up a new competency within the organisation. Itwas
hoped that this investment would lead to enhanced motivation and upliftment of morale. The
literature review (section 2.5.2.3) draws attention to the importance of training and re-skilling
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if new competencies are to be developed and the new information system is to be harnessed to
underpin its new strategy ..
4.3 CASTROt SOUTH AFRICA
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Figure 4.5 - Evolution of IDE implementation.
4.3.1 Background to the company:
Castrol South Africa (Castro! S.A.) is part of the global company Burmah Castrol with
corporate head offices situated in the United Kingdom. Today Castrol (the principle company
of the lubricants divisica of Burmah Castrol) is the world's leading internatior.al lubricants
marketer. Their manufacturing, distribution, research and development facilities are
strategically located throughout the world. Castrol is a global company that operates locally.
As such, Castrol S.A. concentrates on its own market, enabling it to react quickly and
effectively to the specific needs of its local customers, while using the knowledge and support
of a world wide infrastructure. The African market, now open to South African
organisations, is also a target for growth. Castro! South Africa's commitment to providing
products and services which adhere to tl.eir brand values of 'high performance', 'premium
quality' and 'technology led' was a driving factor in the restructuring snd re-engineering
exercise that t0Qk place in 1995.
The objective of the .e-engineering exercise which resulted in a restructuring o.~the local
organisation into six strategic business units, was to build on the organisation's heritage of
product innovation and deliver a service that was totally responsive to the needs of its
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customers. The restructuring led to a renewed serutiny of the organisation's information
technology with a view to supporting the new strategy. Figure 4.6 depicts Castrol's profile.
Figure 4.6- Diagrammatic Representation of Castro I S.A. Pty Ltd.
4.3.2 The Problem
The organisation's policy of continued inforn:ation systems renewal for reasons of business
survival manifested a new dilemma for the organisation. Castrol S.A.'!' strategic plan which
involved a focus on technological advancement, product developme : and enhancement,
improved manufacturing and increased customer service introduced to Lie business a higher
level of complexity which the legacy systems were unable to deal with, without extensive
maintenance tv th .. programs.
For the organisation to maintain its business growth, it needed a stable system to support its
current business environment and it needed an information system that could deal with the
new structure and future growth. The legacy system was not capable of integration and there
were a number of'manual processes in place. Foremost of these was the manual reconciliation
of the general ledger and subsidiary ledgers. Tile export process, WhICh was an area targeted
for growth had a number of manual processes imbedded in it. Added to this, the legacy
system could not deal with the diversity or the international environment (specifically multiple
currencies) which made the export process cumbersome. Data had to be re-keyed into a P.C.
system for the processing of export documents The competitive environment within which
the organisation operated, meant that there was a continual revision of prices which
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necessitated increased manual intervention because the flow of data within the legacy system.
Credit note processing 'was increasing as a result ofincorrect processing.
To position the organisation for future growth, Castro! S.A. felt that they had reached the
stage where, in particular their financi., and manufacturing systems needed rejuvenating and
improvement. Castro! S.A. had historically been highly computerised. In the late 1970's their
computing had been outsourced so that they could concentrate on new development projects.
In the early 1980's the organisation had installed a distributed interactive computing platform.
By the 1990's Castrol S.A. had employed Computer Assisted Software Engineering (CASE)
and Information Engineering to leverage systems ownership to the user community, away
from the IT department. This had not been as successful as was hoped due to skills shortages
experienced in South Africa and the shortcomings in available CASE tools.
Operational Systems
Figure 4.7 ~Flowchart of legacy systems at Castrol SA (Pty) !' .d.
A decision to develop a system using a 4th GL tooi resulted in several problems for the
organisation. The developed system left the organisation reliant on too few key peopJe and
was overlaid over old processes. A lesson learned from this development was that there had
been too much focus on the technology and not on the business. With this in mind, the
organisation WIiS counting on a new system where ownership of the system rested with the
users and line management within the organisation, and not w'th the I.T. department.
As the demands of the business world become more complex, and the demand for increased
systems sophistication and integration develops, maintenance of legacy systems becomes more
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complicated and expensive. Within Castrol S.A. the maintenance and development backlog
was increasing. Moreover, acquiring the correct level ofskill was also becoming increasingly
more difficult attributable directly to the skills shortage within the country.
A further strategy was to free up information systems human resources from the maintenance
of existing systems to enable them to pursue implementation of value added systems.
Development was required for processes which were unique to their business, and which
required cedicated development resources.
Consi-'. .ing closer international business ties, intensifying competition and rapidly changing
business needs including the projected cost of maintaining and developing unique systems, the
organisation undertook an evaluation of integrated software solutions.
4.3.3 The Planning Phase
Since several of Castrol's other international companies had undergone a similar evaluation
and since it was the corporate company's policy (adopted in 1994) to support the business
with packaged software applications rather than uniquely developed systems, it was decided
to investigate the finding of these other Castrol companies. Castrol companies in Europe,
North America, Australia and Asia had selected IDE an the application to support their
business. As such, some in-company experience existed regarding the software. Moreover,
the corpo rate office had concluded a group licence for this software in 1995.
4.3.3.1 Capabilities/Competencim;
A team of people comprising senior management, IT staff and key users however also
investigated other application packages as well as IDE for suitability in the local market A
large number of companies in the same industry had implemented IDE and discussion, sre
had with other organisations in the country who had implemented JDE. Other applications
(BaaniTriton, BPeS and SAP R3) were either too unknown in South Africa, didn't provide
the functionality that JDE did, were poorly supported locally, were too epenslve or the
change was considered too dramatic with no competencies within the organisation, which was
viewed as high risk. As the organisation had internal competencies relating to the hardware
platform it was decided to stay with the current hardware platform.
4.3.::,.2 Software Applications/Information Systems Architecture
A vhit to Denver, Colorado, head office of IDE confirmed for the organisation that IDE's
support :;v,d !oll~;er term plans (vis-it-vis client server technology and strategic direction) were
in keeping witl. expectations of a suitable vendor, JDE was selected as the preferred software
ap! lication I. ,:.;ause of Its outstanding features and functionality and all-round strengths, their
be .ef that tne research and development by JDE, including their client/server solution would
enable Castro' S.A. to acquire a software solution that would cater for their needs well into
the 21sl century.
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Figure 4.8 - Planned IDE Modules for Castrol South Africa (Pty) Ltd.
Owing to the fact that integrated software by design needs more processing power,
consideration was given to the hardware architecture. To take advantage of new features,
including better client/server interfacing between mainstream and P.C. platforms, a new
advanced series AS400 machine was selected.
4.3.3.3 Teams
An executive steering committee consisting of predominantly executive senior management of
Castrol S.A. as well as a consulting manager from IDE was established. Project teams for
each phase of the implementation was established. Each team consisted of a project leader, IS
staff and key users and line management. JDE was to provide full user support throughout
the installation. It was decided to implement IDE using a phased approach and basing it on
the JDF. implementation methodology.
4.3.3.4 Risks
The team identified a number of risks involved in a project of this nature. Firstly the size of
the project in itself was a risk, secondly, there was a lack of in-house skills pertaining to the
software, and thirdly, vendor support was identified as a risk. In this instance it was
highlighted that skilled staff were very mobile with regards to the software, and that IDE was
subject to a high turnover of staff. Also their ability to properly transfer the necessary product
knowledge and to support the full IDE product line over the project period was viewed as a
potential risk.
4.3.3.5 Critical Success Factors
Key sensitivities were indicated, among them being that local management had committed to
making process changes rather than customising the package; the change from unique systems
to a fully integrated, enterprise wide packaged solution would not be easy and thus extensive
re-skilling and training would have to be undertaken; other areas of concern were that
ownership of the system should be held by Castrol S.A. and more specifically \\he functional
users, and, that team members involved should be cross functional with the purpose that the
company's objective is taken into account and not personal views.
4.3.4 Expected Benefits
Castrol SA clearly distinguishes between both the tangible and the intangible benefits. The
basis for implementing the system was with 1:1(':1 intention of staying in business and as such
clear quantification of the benefits in terms of .[>.01was impossible.
Expected benefits were that they would have better information flowing through the
organisation. The fact that the information was on-line real-time would assist the customer
services departrnents within each SBU in being more proactive in their dealings with their
customers. The information would facilitate a key organisational value of 'starting with the
customer' (i.e. learning the customers business, giving a service not just a product, showing
the customer you care and knowing the key people). The instability of the k.r~acy systems and
the difficulty with which they interfaced to other systems had previously hampered their
dealing with customers. It was also expected that internal efficiency and effectiveness would
reduce costs.
The new system was seen as strategic to the organisation and as such would provide a sound
base for them to attach their unique mission critical systems to. It would also free up the
information systems human resource from the continual maintenance of existing systems,
thereby enabling them to pursue the implementation of added value systems.
It was envisioned that head count could be reduced because of the integrated nature of the
svstem, thus doing away with the manual processes that currently existed.
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The limiting factor in the rapidly changing environment and the re-engineering exercise which
had changed the structure and direction of the organisation was the information system that
supported it. The new system was perceived as having the flexibility to change as the business
changed. Furthermore, the promised upgrades with the most up-to-date business practices
and technology features (e.g, internet and client/server technology) would mean that in the
long term the organisation could position itselffor change 'Without the information technology
hampering it. The cost of the maintenance of the system should also be reduced. Less time
would be spent on making programs work - thus more attention could be given to the
deliverables of the total system. This would ensure that all business requirements could be
met.
It was expected that a user driven implementation would improve the support of the business
as there would be less focus on the actual technology and more focus on what the business
required. The prototyping requirements ofERP systems would force user involvement.
Another benefit envisaged ",a' •;.mtof building a new capability within the organisation. The
training and re-skilling that was required to talce full advantage of the new system meant that
there would be an examination of current business processes, which would facilitate a new
sharing of illformation within the organisation. Users would be required to share information
about their roles within the organisation, which in turn could contribute to a thinking about
better ways of doing things.
Castrol S.A. markets a differentiated product and has the biggest range of products compared
to sister companies world wide. By having accurate costing and a flexible pricing structure
together with an accurate gross profit analysis, managers would be able to make better deals
because of better information.
The major benefits of this project stem primarily from the total replacement of an obsolete,
inflexible and inefficient software system. IDE 'Will allow the organisation to remain
competitive and be significantly more proactive in addressing the rapidly changing business
and technological requirements expected in the 21'1 century. The incremental functional
benefits which include the flexibility, the full integration, enhanced automation, paperwork
reduction and operational re-engineering all point to real benefits for the organisation.
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4.4 TRiDENT STEEL
Johnson
& JOmSOil
Figure 4.9 - Evolution of IDE implementation.
4.4.1 Background to the company:
The metal and engineering industry in South Africa represents a third of all manufacturing in
South Africa, embraces more than 10,000 companies and employs approximately 340,000
people. Trident Steel (an Anglo Vaal Group Company) is a steel merchanting organisation
within this industry. Trident comprises six divisions being the Merchanting Division, the
Cutting Division, the Coil Processing Division, the Export Division, Sterling Tube and
Namascor which specialises in steel products.
The Merchanting Division carries a wide range of steel in standard and stock sizes. The
Cutting Division focuses on supplying cut-to-size steel so that customers can save on scrap,
labour and time. The Coil Processing Division specialises in cut-to-length lines and slits cut
steel to exact sizes ready for manufacture or assembly. They provide a wide range of coil
widths, thicknesses and qualities to their customers, Primary customers to this division are
South Africa's motor industry and white goods markets. Sterling Tube specialises in a wide
range of structural round and square tubes. Namascor deals in specialised steel and the
Export Division concentrates on newly opened markets.
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Figure 4.10 - Diagrammatic repre sentation ofthe Trident Group of Companies.
Trident undertook an analysis of industry trends and this showed a long term decline in
demand for structural products. Contrasting with this there was a growth in flat products. In
addition, the price direction of steel was more uncertain and service was becoming more of a
differentiator than price. In 1994 SElFSA (The Steel and Engineering Industry Federation of
South Africa) predicted a significant boost to the steel industry from the RDP (Reconstruction
and Development Program) in South Africa. Potential high growth markets included housing
and education. piping and cold rolled sheets for the automotive and white goods industries.
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4.4.2 The Problem
Due to the recessionary years of the early 1990's in South Africa, Trident had effectively
followed a strategy of forward integration, moving away from the core steel merchanting
business to increased value added products. This was partly by design and partly through
evolution. Since each division had a unique focus and was meeting a different need for each
category of customer there existed an enormous amount of manual administrativework. A
senior manager within the organisation comments that " for so long we have been customer
focused, but the processes were wrong for the customer focus. This meant we neglected
other areas of our business. The customer got his steel cut to his requirement, and on time,
but we didn't optimise our loads and made many unnecessary delivery runs." Other system
and process deficiencies included a lack of accurate costing and profitability analysis
information, customer quotations were manually processed, certain divisions had a manual
material requisitions process, order capturing was paper based, and the credit note process
was cumbersome - whilst a number of processes were automated - there was no integration of
systems.
The legacy systems were written for specific processes within each division, and were
standalone. They did not lend themselves to natural bending or integration. The end result
was that interfaces had to be developed and the ownership of the data rested with a few
people within the organisation.
o
Figure 4.11 - Tridents legacy systems.
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The business objective Trident was zeeking to meet included maintaining and improving
customer service, an increase in market share in selected sectors, achieving an appropriate
return on investment (ROn for expenditure on equipment, and an improvement in process
efficiency (e.g. on scrapping of steel, stock levels, machine utilisation, fleet utilisation, labour
efficiency and spares.) n",f' , was also a requirement to improve adherence to customer's
quality standards.
Trident's mission "to be the premier provider of quality steel products and related services in
the markets that we serve" had obvious implications for IT. An evaluation of their current
information technologies within the organisation was undertaken in order to assess how IT
could assist in the changes the organisation was seeking to make.
4.4.3 The Planning Phase
Andersen Consulting was retained to assist in developing a strategic information system plan
which was the direct outcome of the changed and enhanced business strategy. The steering
committee for this project was chaired by the managing director of Trident. The project
sponsor was the sales director and the project team had '"< mix of IT personnel, line managers
and external consultants. The committee gave considerauon not only to indus. - . analysis, but
also to skills, resources, processes and management practices. The currei t application
architecture was mapped out, which highlighted the major systems limitations. Various
alternatives were investigated, among them being the development ofin-house systems unique
to Trident's business and selective package solutions. The brieffor the team was to develop
an IT solution that provided a competitive edge, enhanced customer service and
complemented the company's entrepreneurial culture.
To do this the team had to meet the varying business requirements of all divisions within
Trident and its existing subsidiaries. The requirement was to implement systems as Soon as
possible in those areas that provide significant business benefits and to do so with the
minimum of disruption to the organisation. The solutions had to be based on proven, reliable
and well supported technology that could accommodate changing business needs. The
technology infrastructure needed to be flexible and integrated to allow for growth. Three
alternatives were investigated.
4.4.3.1 Processes
With Trident's focus being on the customer - the strategy of the organisation was thus
positioned to suite customer needs - not having the systems in place to support this strategy
meant that other areas of the business got neglected. E.g. The customer got his delivery of
steel, however, loads were not optimised and there were unnecessary delivery runs. In
changing the systems and core processes to be more suited to a customer focus, benefits could
be gained. With new processes in place logistics could be streamlined, which meant that the
organisation could optimise their inventory, loads and deliveries to get the order to the
customer on time and ...vith efficiency, which would result in cost savings for the company.
The adoption of a new IS together with Trident's re-engineered processes would force the
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organisation to adapt to more modern business tWO ,;~kes. Trident viewed the changing of old
processes as fundamental to the new IS as it would contribute to more automation, tracking
would be facilitated, and there would be more information sharing. This would result. in a
reduction in time and resources due to certain processes being performed concurrently.
(Refer section 2.4.1)
4.4.3.2 Capabilities
The changes in the scope of Trident's strategic business requirements had not been adequately
supnorted by their legacy systems over the years. The strengths within the IT division
included a committed and responsive track record to providing user support; there was a flat
organisational structure and , : ost staff had cross-functional business and systems knowledge.
However, the legacy systems r' .ictures (programs and data) were old, poorly constructed and
difficult to enhance The IT depar» ::)I1t,' response to the changed business environment
began a rewrite of tlII 1\' 'sterns, but due to the effort required to maintain existing legacy
systems, could only devote 20% of their time to development work. Added to this was the
risk that too little attention would be given to processes and would thus result in the rewrite
being ov-erlaid over existing inefficient business processes.
4.4.3.3 Information Systems Architecture/Software Applications
The first alternative was to continue developing custom systems on the existing AS:40Q
platform. Factors negating this plan included time and resources needed to implement such a
plan. Ongoing operational costs could be relatively high with continued in-house maintenance
and development. Notwithstanding this, custom s=stems as opposed to packaged systems
were still viewed as being the best to meet Trident' ~o requirements of maintaining competitive
euge.
The second alternative was to select a package solution for the AS40Q platform and custom
develop select modules that were unique to Trident. Favourable factors to this approach were
that the effort in systems development was reduced, external support was available for future
releases and application support, and that proven business practices were encapsulated within
packages, which ord not have to be reinvented. Factors neg" In ;s plan included the
perception thet systems could be too complex or rigid for Trident's .e business processes
and that too much depended on how the organisation implemented and utilised the system.
The thi-d alternative was to select a package solution for a platform other than the AS400 and
custom develop integrated solutions that were unique to Trident. The important
considerations ofthis plan included resourcing, i.e. new IS skills would be required to support
the new software and hardware nlatforrc, and this was seen as a major problem.
After due consideration the committee agreed that the second alternative would be the correct
route to take for the organisation. Trident's unique 'System modules would be custom
developed and integrated with the package. This route was seen to fulfil business
requirements in the shortest time possible. It would be less disruptive to the organisation and
solutions would be based on proven, reliable and well supported technology. It was also
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viewed as being the most cost effective as it was seen as having the sh irtest . . 'back period.
IDE was selected as the preferred solution after investigating Busines S 40; ::-:S,Mapics
XA, CA-PlLl\/IS, Software 2000 and Prodstar 2. Criteria used in selecting the package
included functional fit, "integration, hardware platform, implementat on effort, cost, risk,
flexibility to cater for changing needs, upgradeability, ongoing operatic nal costs anti ongoing
systems support.
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Figure 4.12 - Planned IDE' .xlules for Trident Steel
4.4.3.4 Organisational Values
A training schedule was developed which would include the upgrading ot skills within the
information technology department anti employee re-skilling to suit the lew cross-functional
processes. For the r=w IS to be successful tremendous effort would j ieed to be put into
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upgrading skills. AEKing (1995) and Johnston (1988) suggest, an infrastructure of skills, or
internal capabilities provide competitive advantage. The skills level of personnel was not
oriented towards integrated software, and in some cases, computer skills were non-existent.
The training endeavour would need to be multifaceted: a focus on basic computer skills, on
process changes and business knowledge was needed, and lastly, functional training on the
computer system would be necessitated in some areas .
.Another guiding principle linked to the training and re-skilling of people was that there would
be information sharing which would contribute to synergy between people and departments
within the organisation ..
Critical success factors identified included a focus on processes which would enable the
information system to support the business, user involvement and ownership of the processes
and information system, top management commitment (which was considered of crucial
importance so that management could communicate systems initiatives and the related impact
to internal staff) and a flexible integrated software solution to support the business.
4.4.4 Expected Benefits
Trident's management recognised that there were benefits that were not clearly discernible.
They were expecting increased revenue attributable to improved customer service which
would be supported through IT by improved on-line pricing methods, through integrated sales
fulfilment processes divisions and subsidiaries, and through shorter order processing lead
times. Timeous credit information and real-time availability checking were also seen as
enhancing customer service. The automated order tracking system would 1...'\d to proactive
order management.
Another benefit, improved internal efficiency and effectiveness, could reduce costs.
Integrated shop floor planning, job tracking and costing would be improved because of the
information system. Management expected a reduction in administration effort through
simplified inventory control procedures. Integrated despa tch planning and logistics would
reduce costs as well. Synchronising their fleet with despatch and production plans would
facilitate efficiency and also reduce costs,
It was expected that management decision making would be enhanced through accessibility to
formalised and integrated operational plans (e.g. sales forecasts, inventory replenishment
plans, projected inventory levels and transportation plans.) There would be the availability of
information to support total logistics cost analysis and planning. There would be visibility of
product and process costs, also of customer and order profitability. Analysis of sales by
product, industry, business unit and customer categories would be easier.
Organisational development through the development of business analysis skills was seen as
another important intangible benefit. The skills profile of the personnel in the IT function of
the organisation would undergo a gradual change: from focusing on development within a
function to underst-nding the business and implementing integration within all the functions.
The integrated system would require a broader knowledge of the business due to the impact
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of information in other areas of the business, Added to this, all personnel in the organisation
would need to undergo training on the system for functionality and understanding the flow of
information through each function.
Tangible benefits include; mcreasing Cutting sales revenue by alleviating the current paper-
work bottlenecks through the automation and integration rrrv'ess. The new system was
perceived to improve pricihg accuracy and consistency, quotation turnaround times could be
reduced and follow up of open quotations would be improved. Cutting scrap could be
reduced by better information on theoretical and actual quantities scrapped, more optimal
allocation of material to cutting jobs (as a result of better visibility of material requirements
across customer orders), by improved visibility of off-cuts held in stock, and finally, by better
control of materials issued against jobs.
A better return on scrap could be obtained by being able to differen.iate between different
categories of scrap on the sys: .zn (e.g, light scrap, bin scrap, off cuts and claims.) and by
improved visibility of off cuts and claims held in stock. CPD scr,« could he reduced by
measuring and monitoring the ',Ieoretica and actual quantities scrapped.
Transportation and fleet costs could be reduced by combining loads thr«., ~h intograted
despatch planning, by prioritising despatch loads and optimising external transportatlon.
4.5 Johnson and Johnson Professional Products
Ttilltmt
Figure 4.13 ~Evolution of IDE implementation.
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4.5.1 Background to the Company:
Johnson and Johnson (J&J) a world-wide company, consists of more than one hundred and
seventy companies, marketing health care products in more than 175 countries. The company
engages in producing products that serve a broad segment of medical needs. These range
from baby care, first aid and hospital products to prescription pharmaceuticals, diagnostics
and products relating to dermatology and feminine hygiene. J&J with $21,6 billion in sales in
1996 is the world's largest and most comprehensive manufacturer of health care products
serving the consumer, pharmaceutical and professional markets. 1 heir innovati· ~health care
products have resulted in consistent financial performance. The company has 64 consecutive
years of sales increases, 35 consecutive years of dividend increases and 53 continuous years of
dividend payments. Innovation is considered to be at the heart of J&J. Their aim is to spend
$1.9 billion on research and development seeking advances in medical research and
technology.
In South Africa, J&J has three subsidiaries, Jansens Pharmaceuticals whose focus is on animal
health and pharmaceutical products, Johnson and Johnson Consumer, whose focus is on
consumer products (skin care and baby products) and Johnson and Johnson Professional
Produc ts who are focused on the hospital and medical market. This case study will focus on
Johnson and Johnson Professional Products. (J&J PP)
J&J PP employs approximately 350 people countrywide, 200 of which are concentrated on
the manufacturing and distribution function of the organisation, and the remaining 150
personnel are employed in the marketing, financial and administrative function. Regional
offices for the organisation are in Durban, Cape Town and Port Elizabeth. As such, J&J PP
South Africa, is a marketing and distribution organisation.
J&J PP consists of seven business units, being Ethicon, Medical, Orthopaedic, Endo-surgery,
Vistakon, Diagnostics and Interventional systems. Each division has its own sales forecast,
profit and loss accounts and their own products. 40% of products are manufactured locally,
however, the new products line and high technology products are all imported. As product
leaders, their products are differentiated, for which a premium is charged. With the weak
rand/dollar exchange rate and the changes that the South African medical environment is
undergoing management is presented with a particular challenge in respect of'maintaining their
competitive edge.
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Figure 4.13 - Diagrammatic representation of the Johnson & Johnson Professional Products.
4.5.2 ifhe Problem:
To maintain their market share in South Africa and with their focus being on customer care,
the organisation deemed it necessary to home in on operational efficiency to further streamline
their business. This must be seen against the backdrop of the South African health care
environment which is faced with tremendous pressure - private medical aid schemes which
were financed partly by organisat.ons and partly by employees and excluded, in most cases a
large group of South Africa's workforce, underwent changes which required organisations to
include all personnel in equal company benefits. Managed healthcare systems have come to
the fore as medical aid schemes are proving too expensive for organisations. (For example,
Anglo American has established their own company - Southern Life Care, to manage all their
own employees via a managed care system.) Whilst there is much debate surrounding health
care in South Africa, management of JNJ PP believe that private health care will expand,
albeit with CI)St pressures em prices.
The World Health Organisation having awarded South Afhca First World status (albeit that
South Africa is a developing country) has meant that South Africa is not entitled to drug aid
from the World Health Organisation. Labour costs in Smith Mica are high in return for low
productivity and the high cost of capital. Trade resnictions of the apartheid years led
manufacturers to produce medicines here in quantities that are small in world terms and are
more expensive to produce. The government is seeking to provide cheaper healthcare which
in tum is putting pricing pressure on medical companies. Within the public sector cheaper
medical assistance is provided in government hospitals - but with the shortage of doctors and
surgeons in these hospitals whom J&J PP target and with the focus in government hospitals of
using the cheapest products, J&J PP is now face.' with charging smaller premiums to stay
competitive, In the past the organisation was able \0 charge a premium of between 20 and
40% lor the research and development and the technology that was invested to bring the
product to market, but with the changing health care environment these margins are being
squeezed.
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To be prepared for the changes that were taking place in South Africa in the early 1990's J&J
pp required from their IT systems a solution that would support the rapid changes that the
organisation was expecting. The company had in-house written developed systems which had
initially been developed for a midrange system (IBM System 34),but had been migrated to an
IBM System 38, and later to an ,..1AS400. The software was batch driven, and the; bulk of
the programs had merely been converted to run on later technology. The software had been
written for hardware where capabilities had been very restrictive. The systems comprised of
financial applications, stock control, distribution, sales and purchase order entry. There was
no integration between the systems, and before any capturing of data took place, was placed
on a paper system. T";s contributed to a double load of work. Two such paper processes
existed, one in the receiving area and the other being the sales order entry function
i ..In. v.·en.·tmY. ···.· •.•.. ·•·.· .•. ·••.• · •••. :.••. m. :" .. :..•.
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Figure 4.14 - Flowchart of legacy systems at Johnson & Johnson Professional Products.
The rapid change of pace in the business world meant that for every change to the business,
software changes had to be made to keep pace. For every new acquisition the parent
company made and decided to market in South Africa, programming changes needed to be
made. Added to this the organisation felt it was time for a closed loop MRPJI system which
demanded a fully integrated system.
4.5.3 The Plan:
An evaluation of the business and its IT was undertaken to establish a plan. A cross-
functional team of high level managers within the organisation was established which
consisted of the financial controller within the organisation, the IT manager, a business analyst
from within IT, 2 product managers, 2 marketing managers and the materials manager.
Independent external consultants were contracted to assist in the business systems evaluation,
so at to avoid politicising the evaluation.
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From the systems requirement specification came the brief - integrated software was needed
to assist with operational efficiency. To develop in-house systems with the land of
functionality that packages could offer was not cost effective To develop a system with the
overhead of maintenanc ! work on then current systems, was considered too high, as 40% of
the IT department's time was taken up with maintenance work.
Added to this was the perception that pre-packaged software had come of age. More
business techniques were available, built into the packaged software. Within the time frame
given, in-house systems could not compete with the breadth of functionality available and thus
packaged solutions were considered to be superior.
As J&J world wide were knowledgeable on the AS400 platform and at that time the AS400
was the most state of the art midrange technology, it was decided to remain on the AS400
platform and investigate systems from that point of reference. The skills base within the
organisation also received consideration, and as all of its skill was invested in the AS400, it
seemed most cost efficient and prudent to stick with a known element. IDE was selected over
other packages such as BPCS, Assignment 400, Maples, Solutions 2000 and MacPac.
Evaluation of the packages took place on a points system, considering functionality, ease of
use, vendor support and cost. Figure 4.15 depicts the modules implemented by Johnson <L'1d
Johnson. The manufacturing operations (figure 4.15) are targeted for implementation in 1998.
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Figure 4.15 - IDE modules installed at Johnson & Johnson Professional Products.
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4.5.4 ExpeGted Benefits:
Owing to the on-line integrated functionality of the system is was expected that headcount
would be reduced. This headcount reduction was expected in both the functional areas of the
business as well as in the IT department. From the perspective of the IT department, the
profile of the skill was expected to change, as it was envisaged that there would be less
maintenance work and more building of business knowledge.
The organisation also expected to achieve more reliable systems with less intervention as the
nature of the system had changed - from being batch driven to being an interactive on-line
system.
It was perceived that there would be more functionality for users and that these users would
be less reliant on the IT department to get information from the system.
As it was an integrated package and processes were: re-engineered in preparation for the new
information technology, benefits were expected from operational efficiencies.
Financial figures were reported to its corporate head office in America thirteen days after
month-end dose offs. It was expected that figures would be ready much sooner after close
off when the new system was inplace. The aim was close-off plus five days.
The upgrade path that the system offered promised increasing functionality with each new
release of software. In-house systems had locked the organisation into a method of
processing and delivered very little in the way of extra functionality.
Stock holding was running at 180 days - whereas by comparison, in Europe, J&J companies'
stock holding was running at 60 days. It was envisaged that the stock holding days could be
reduced once the integrated system was installed.
4.5.5 Benefits obtained:
On the question of benefits obtained from the system. John Calvert, operations director of the
organisation says "the first time you implement a package of this nature you don't get
benefits, mostly you get unexpected disasters! Being part of a big multinational company like
J&J with its decentralised management structure (the package) has assisted the organisation in
being able to take on new products and franchises without major system changes. To
maintain our world class standards has meant we have been able to respond to the business
changes rapidly."
Whilst it was acknowledged that benefits were slow to occur, another benefit was in the
information flow through the organisation Users, albeit haltingly, took ownership of the
system and became less reliant on IT staff. However, as the system introduced more
complexity to the business as seen by users (in that systems weren't written for their specific
business function, but were introduced as part of a process) a higher level of skill was
required, and in some cases, there was actually an increase in staff levels, and in some areas of
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the business remuneration far exceeded that of other similar departments owing to the skills
levels required. In this respect remarked Koot du Plessis, financial director of the
organisation, ' the system didn't deliver the cost savings we were expecting."
The IT department reduced its headcount. The role of the IT department also changed.
Whit',t development work was reduced, the skills profile of IT personnel also changed - they
rec.ared more skills after the implementation. Together with their technical and programming
t,kiils, they need -d to have cross-functional business knowledge and enhanced people skills.
The personnel in the IT department were working more closely with the user departments and
were perceived to be part of the business. Ultimately the organisation sees the demise of the
II department as it was once known. They envisage perhaps one or two operations staff,
with the rest of the people in the department being deployed into departments where the work
gets done. Says John Calvert again, "the days of the IT department as it was known are
numbered - it is too eznensive to maintain different systems and to maintain huge departments
of development workers, economies of scale will dictate. Packages are cheaper in the long
run, provided they are implemented correctly."
4.5.6 Lessons Learned:
J&J PP affirm that large scale package implementations must be viewed not as just another
project within the company, but as THE project an organisation undertakes. John Calvert
maintains that organisations fail because they view the implementation of ERP packages as
just another project and make IT responsible for it.
After an unsuccessful upgrade of the software they also believe that a project team must have
the right mix of skills - i.e. people drawn from within the organisation and not too many
external consultants. In their experience, if the project team doesn't gel then the project is
faced with potential problems. Management saw as an immeasurable advantage the fact that
they had one person on the team who was drawn frcm within the organisation who had cross-
functional knowledge of the business and who also had a broad knowledge of the package. A
recent upgrade of software has gone so successfully after a change in the focus of the project
team and also with different players.
The organisation also maintains that to re-engineer and implement software at the same time
puts the organisation at risk. The organisation should make II decision - either to re-engineer
well in advance or to re-engineer after the system has gone live. States John Calvert, "you
can't do both - there is just too much change. We had to make a decision and accept that we
were not doing this right. It is also often a difficult route to take - not to re-engineer". Time
pressures, skills profiles and an organisation's culture normally dictates, as does the process
that needs to be put on hold until after the system is in place.
Management are of the opinion that a project of this nature can not be an IT project. Midway
through the project staff changes necessitated the shifting of the project from a user driven
project to an IT driven project. At this stage problems were experienced with the project.
Whilst there was a lot of politics involved, a decision was made to move the project away
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from IT again. They got more benefit when they moved the project away from IT. They
were amazed at how much commitment they got fro n the user base within the organisation
when they knew they were responsible for the system.
Experience with a package of this nature has taught them that extensive teaming within the
organisation only happened once they had a major problem with the package. No matter how
much training had been given, nobody believed ho'" central the system was to the business.
Only after immense effort to resolved problems was there a grasp of how important the
system was to their effort and a renewed interest to make it work.
4.6 Conclusion
This chapter has presented case studies off OUT organisations based on evidence gathered from
interviews, organisational documentation and observation. In each case the background to the
company "vas presented, their problems were documented and their planning phase was set
out. Competencies, capabilities, information systems architectures and organisational values
were highlighted in order to establish how organisations were utilising packaged software
applications in Older to achieve strategic and transformational benefits for their organisations.
In the following chapter these will be analysed to ascertain if organisations are achieving
transformational benefits from the utilisation of large scale packages.
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CHAPTERS
5.1 ANAL '(SIS
The main aim of this research was to discover how organisations were utilising large scale
software packages in order to achieve strategic and transformational benefits for their
organisations. Each of the organisations presented in chapter fou- were responding to
their changing business environments by re-evaluating and changing their business
strategies and then paving the way for their information systems to support their new
strategies. It is a given that most South African organisations were insular and were
forced to concentrate on local markets because of the sanctions embargo of the 1980's.
With the cessation of the sanctions embargo in the early 1990's, South African
organisations were launched into a globally competitive environment.
At the outset of the interviews with each organisation, the 'Value Disciplines' model
(Treacy and Wiersema, 1995) was presented so that the organisation had a framework
relating to their redirected strategies. Johnson and Johnson Professional Products and
Castrol S.A. were clearly 'Product Leader' organisations; Mondi Cartonboard's new
strategy was aimed at the 'Operational Excellence' value discipline and Trident Steel was
aiming at the 'Customer Intimacy' value discipline. Of interest is the fact that each of the
four case studies affirmed that customer service was a high priority for their organisations.
As Tr sacy and Wiersema suggest, customer choices are Clearly driving organisations to
rethink their strategies.
An analysis of the four case studies highlighted a number of interrelating issues which will
be reviewed in the following sections.
5.2 BUSINESS PROCESS REENGINEERING
From the research it was found that although each organisation had different strategies
which led to their reengineering efforts, the manner in which these efforts took place also
differed. What was clear was that infcrmatlon technology was the key to the
reengineering efforts - it assisted the on .\. asations in refocusing their business, change the
structure of the organisation, and far·,1: .red improvements in levels of performance.
At Mondi, the change in business from a production push to a market pull, together with a
refocus on who their customer was, required that the organisation reengineer their
business. The previous reengineering exercise which k"j ~d'the organisation with flat
structures, (without having had job specifications, practices or systems redesigned), had
resulted in low morale and low levels (Ifmotivation within the human resources domain of
the organisation. The literature review highlights King's (1994) viewpoint that
reengineering fails because it is ?pplied at a tactical rather than a strategic level. Mondi's
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new endeavour VIas based on lessons learned and was not focused on downsizing, but
rather on acquiring a different category of customer, which required that their operating
model change. (i.e. manufacture to forecast and not to order).
The reel •gineeung exercise which took place at Castrol in 1995 and which resulted te
restructuring of the organisation into six strategic business units (ElBU), was undi..
without a supporting information system. Each of these SBU's had their own cusrome.s
and their own products. The inhibiting facto: in this reengineering exercise was the legacy
system in place at Castrol - extensive and expensive changes were required to the system,
which resulted in cumbersome and 'patched' changes to processes and systems. Whilst it
was found that the reengineering exercise did indeed refocus attention on the customer,
the maintenance to the systems to assist in this focus were not responsive to prerequisite
needs. The organisation found that, as Davenport and Short point out, IT is the key
enabler of BPR. Personnel affected by the reengineering found that their jobs became
more complex, that they had no control over the proce 3, and that to maintain a customer
focus was being increasingly hampered by their information systems.
Trident's new mission 'to be the premier provider of quality steel, products and related
services in the markets that they served' set in motion an evaluation of how the business
and its supporting structures were performing. The strategy, to move away from core
steel merchanting, to increased value added products, required an organisation that was
responsive and intuitive to customer needs. It was found that the mfo-rnstion systems in
place could not respond to these needs.
Unlike Mondi and Castrol, Trident did not first reengineer their business and then seek an
IT solution. Trident first evaluated a number of IT solutions and then sought to
reengineez according to the capabilities the technology could offer. Subramanian and
Lacity (1997) refer to a similar approach in a case study they undertook. However,
whereas their study concluded that this hindered BPR., other studies have demonstrated
the success of such an approach. (Appleton, 1997).
As a 'Product Leader' company JNJ PP was continually adding new products and
franchises to their portfolio. As stated in section 4.5.2, for every new acquisition the
parent company made and marketed in South Africa, programming changes to the
information system were required. Since the software package has been 'live' for five
years, greater insight into the impact of their reengineering efforts can be derived. John
Calvert, operations director of the organisation is of the opinion that to reengineer and
implement large scale packages at the same time, puts the organisation at risk. JNJ PP's
experience was that there was too much change at one time. It was found that projects to
upgrade the software to gain benefits from increased functionality, were done so without
any reengineering efforts. Once the users were comfortable with the software, only then
did reengineering take place. This was found to delay benefits, however JNJ PP felt that
time pressures, skills profiles and organisational culture dictated this methodology.
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5.3 PROCESSES
This section will show that implementing large scale software packages forces a re-
evaluation of processes within the organisation. It also hi.?hlightsthe danger that ben ..its
can be reduced where an organisation chooses to leave old processes in place where a
better solution could have been applied. Of interest is the fact that three of the four
organisations presented in chapter four did not follow Hsmmer and Champy's (1995)
advise to obliterate what they had, rather, they opted for the more moderate approach of
process improvements. Mondi, whilst not having a 'clean slate' from which to begin,
sought a radical changefor their business.
In order for Mondi to shift their business strategy from 'make to order' to 'make to
forecast', their processes needed changing. It was found that their processes were
overcomplicated due to information systems inhibitors. The problems experienced at
Mondi and referred to in section 4.2.3.1, further underline- Davenport and Short's (1990)
point that functionally separated tasks cannot support today"s changing business
requirements. All the areas where IT could have been supporting the business were
incorrectly deployed within the organisation. Whilst there was automation, clearly the
informational aspects of their processes were mistrusted. The tracking, analytical,
integrative aspects (Davenport and Short, 1990) of their processes fell short of business
requirements. Only once their processes were mapped and reengineered did Mondi
investigate specific softwarepackages.
The approach that Castro! followed relating to their processes, differed from Mondi, .
that a prior reengineeringexerciseat Castrol had streamlinedall major processes, so that it
was envisagedthat only smallerprocesses would need tailoring. It was found that Castrol
underestimated the need to change their processes when, during the prototyping phase of
their project, a number of problems with processes became evident. CastroI's
commitment to installing the software without any system modifications also forced a
number of unintended process changes on the organisation. Moreover, there was
reluctance to map processes as it was felt that all the steps were clearly evident. This led
to project delays, Davenport (1994) and Heygate (1990) point out that organisational
structure and culture contributes largelyto the success ofa reengineering effort, of which
processes are central. Furthermore, Gutierez (1993) contends that where an imbalance
between the software product and the process exists, adequate technical and procedural
solutions together with organisationalsupport i" .equired. Castrol has since begun a fresh
evaluation of all businessprocesses.
At Trident the legacy systems were written for specific processes within each division-
consequently, there was no integrationof data which led to extra workloads, inefficiencies
and duplication of data. IT (and more specificallythe software) was seen as a key enabler
of their redefined processes. The various legacy systems and manual processes that had
existed, had been instrumental in the organisation maintaining a customer focus at great
expense to itself: Davenport and Short (1990) draw attention to the fact that business
should not be viewed in terms of functions, divisions or products, but as key processes.
Trident retained their divisions but functions within these divisions became processes; each
division had visibility of all processes and information on the new system.
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The JNJ PP case study presented in chapter four outlined that the reengineerlng exercise
was managed by the IT department, and as such was an IT driven pro, ct. It was found
that this impacted the project from the outset. B .cause personnel within the IT
department never had the authority or the credibility to enforce process changes, there was
resistance to the changes put in place. TIllS in tum inhibited the benefi' pertaining to
informatior sharing, process changes and contributed to a power struggle relating to
information sharing 'within the organisation. This underscores Davenport's {l~94)
viewpoint that successful process changes can only be carried out if the organisation's
culture is changed as well.
5.4 COMPETENCIES
Notwithstanding the fact that all four organisations feIt that their information systems were
an inhibitor to the changes they were seeking to make, they still viewed their information
systems as a core competence.
At Mondi it was recognised that any competencies that existed within the organisation
were diminished in valve as a consequence of the business being mor e functional than
cross-functional. The competencies within the IT function were not leveraged to support
the business in a co-ordinated maimer. Parker (1996) contends that core competencies
and learning organisations cannot succeed when the IT department cannot deliver and
disperse information and shared knowledge, throughout the enterprise.
The evaluation of processes at Mondi which revealed that islands of information existed
pointed to the inefficiencies within the organisation. Without an IT competency within
Mondi it was evident that no knowledgeable decision making could take place, and that
knowledge transfer would not happen. It was also evident to the organisation that a new
information system alone could not provide the benefits they were seeking - a holistic
approach was taken at Mondi, to build on procedures, people and products to build a new
competence vithin the organisation,
Whilst Castrol's core competence was surelv its product that it sold, the information
pertaining to the movement of that product (inbound and outbound) fell short of business
requirements. The legacy system encouraged managers of the six SBU's to make
decisions based upon improving their divisions performance at the price of other SBU's.
Parker (1996) confirms that old systems enforce old cultures in her study of Analog.
Analog introduced a new information system which was designed to enforce co-operation
between divisions based upon imp-oving company performance, instead of divisional
performance. The new information system that Castrol was preparing to put in place
would give all SBU's visibility of stock movement and commitment, and would enhance
customer service.
65
Within the IT department at Castrol, the only competency that existed was related to
hardware and software programming. Business skills rested with one member of the
department, consequently, resources were stretched. Moreover, the svstem in place was
written using a 4th GL tool and that competence rested with (he same person.
Accordingly, Castro! determiner that a new competence was required within the
organisation - an IT competence ~hat had the necessary analytical and business knowledge
skills. It was felt that the introduction of a software package would initiate the building of
such a compete .sce within the organisation.
Trident viewed competencies as an important contributor to the success of the new IT -
just how vital IT as a core competence was, only manifested itself well into the project.
Comments the sales director of the organisation; "we didn't realise just how reliant were
we were on a computer (until we were well into the project) - it affects everybody's'
lives." His statement relates to their belief that more people studied the pt ocesses in the
company to a greater depth than ever before. This contributed to knowledge and
information sharing which was fundamental to the building of this new competency.
JNJ PP, driven by the need to have a system in place to deal with the entry of new
franchises to the South AI' can market, and later on, to deal with the changed health-care
environment, centred their approach on the products and the marketing drives within the
organisation. The need for a new IS was seen as crucial, however, the business objective
got obscured. Whilst the IT was clearly identified and incorporated into the companies
overall strategic plan, their mistake was to allow the project to be driven by the IT
department.
5.5 CAPABILITIES
It was found that the issue of capabilities was of importance to all four organisations
presented in chapter four. However, two of the organisations viewed capability building
as an organisation-wide and process driven function, whilst the other two organisations
focused entirely on the IT function.
At Mondi capability building was assessed at an organisation-wide l.:vel, with special
attention given to the IT function. A change in strategy such as that which Mondi was
undertaking required focus being given to physical, organisational and human
resources.(Refer section 2.5.2) 1t was found that Mondi gave these equal attention.
Given the complexity and scale of the change that Mondi was about to undertake, the
organisation gave due consideration to its IT structure as well. Mondi saw in the IT the
means through which their strategy could be accomplished. Marks (1996) affirms that
organisational change is brought about by people and not technology it was found that
Mondi recognised the importance of the role that people played in making the IT a
success. Training and re-skilling both in business and the software application was
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scheduled for all employees. It was found that the organisation was putting in place
mechanisms for organisational learning.
At Castrol the subject of capabilities centred largely around the IT department - being the
physical and human resources that were needed in place to assist in the strategic direction
of the organisation. Only as the understanding of the system grew, did the focus on
capabilities escalate. The organisation chose to remain with their existing hardware
architecture, as it was recognised that to remove this capability would put the organisation
at risk. (Considering the overall project.) Likewise, the selection of the software package
pointecl to the organisation wanting to retain some of its IT capability in terms of software
programming. To assist in the training of business knowledge for the IT personnel, each
person was allocated to a team that was mapping current business processes. It is too
early in the project life cycle to determine if this method of skills enhancement has been
effective. Castro I views its IT as strategic to the organisation having learned from
experience (refer section 4.3.2) just how imbedded IT is in the organisation.
Trident's view on capabilities extended to all personnel within the organisation. Senior
management of the organisation were confident that the new IT put in place would
support its business needs, but they Were concerned about the skills levels of all
employees. To this end, extensive training and re-skilling took place. It was their view
that the skills level was net oriented to processes and integrated software. Most
departments were functional, and in some cases, staff had never vsed a computer.
Training (and learning) took place in three areas: in the business arena, application training
and ftmctional training.
It was found that within Trident, the learning culture which was initiated contributed to a
broader knowledge of the business, and staff were keen to share their views. The learning
culture put in place at Trident fostered a sharing of beliefs and goals as suggested by
Parker. (1996) Parker states that organisations need to create a new culture that makes
people feel safe in learning, i.e, they must have a motive, a sense of direction and the
opportunity to try new things without fear of punishment. Comments the sales director of
the organisation, "the skills we have in place now are dramatically r'lfferent to those that
were in place a year ago."
The consideration JNJ PP gave to capabilities was centred solely on the IT function within
the organisation. It was on this basis that the project team decided to stay with the current
hardware and seek out P. package that would run on that hardware. Training focused
purely on the functionality of the system and training was also loft to the IT department to
roll out. Because of the problems that the organisation experienced with this approach,
new projects relating to upgrades and training, had teams drawn from the user base to
install them. According to Appleton (1997) managers neglec ,;~o assess not only the skills
development needed by employees but also the organisationu changes required of them,
It was found that JNJ PP learned that training was an important factor when implementing
large scale packages.
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5.6 INFORMATION SYSTEMS ARCHITECTURE
The point made by Segars and Grover (1996) and referred to in section 2.3 is that the
effective utilisation of IT can only be achieved by carefully evaluating organisational needs
and only then matching them to the teclmology solution This was demonstrated by the
four case studies presented in chapter four and elaborated on in previous sections of this
chapter. This section will focus on the framework proposed by Segars and Grover and in
particular, the 'physical level' of the framework. The other two levels, being the
'Conceptual level' and the 'Logical level' were indirectly dealt with in previous sections of
this chapter.
CONcePTUAL LEVEL
Enterpfi~
Model
UlGICAI.. LEVEL
Figure 5.1 - Information Systems Architecture as proposed by Segars & Grover (1996).
At Mondi the deployment of incompatible technologies and stand-alone departmental
systems had had an efi.....ct on efficiencies within the organisation. Nolan': Stage Model
(1979) was useful in pinpointing the direction of the change. It was ascertained that
Mcndi was at stage 3. (Where high levels 0'; controls were required, and where
information systems planning was given increased visibility.) The hardware and software
in ,I-llaCeat Mondi was an inhibiting factor for the business. The problem at Mondi
underscores the Segars and Grover viewpoint that an information systems architecture is
crucial to the success of an IT enabled strategy. It was found that Mondi's decision to
stay with the current pluform of hardware and implement a software package to integrate
all data was based on Ii icisions made at the conceptual a.id logical level of the Segars and
Grover framework. Mondi's intention was to make use of the 'co-existence' features of
IDE (refer section 1.3) whereby certain areas of the organisation could use 'green screens'
(specifically where skills levels would be hampered by the use of client/server technology);
in other areas of the organisation client/server technology could be deployed, using a
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single database ani server. This decision was made at the physical level of the Segar'> and
Grover framework. Moreover. as Mondi conformed to the 'Operationally Excellent Value
Discipline', they were strivi, g for low overhead, with processes that were highly
automated. (Treacy ar·; Wiersema, i995).
As Castrcl had bistoricaliy been highly computerised, the importance of IT was imbedded
in the organisation - however, ownership of information rested with the IT department.
The unsuccessful deployment of an IT system in 1990 had str=ngthened the viewpoint
within the organisation that data should rest with users and not w.th IT. With reference to
Nolan's Stage Model, Castrol was at stage 4 - where emphasis was on integration, user
control of information systems costs and the use of databases.
T~,eSegars and Grover lSA framework was also relevant to the Castrol case study. At
the conceptual level c..msiderations included the structure of the organisation (i.e. the six
SBU's) and the processes. However, policies weren't changed. At the logical level
middle management (represented or. the project teams and involved with requirements
analysis) provided a blueprint for zpplicattcns usage. At the physical level consideration
was given to hardware, the networks and the software applications. The implementation
of IDE was undertaken in a phased approach. (Refer section 2.4).
It was found that at Trident the awareness of the systems inefficiencies pertaining to the
organisations customer focus was high. The change initiative that the organisation
launched, placed it in the Treacy and Wiersema value discipline of 'customer intimacy.'
The Segars and Grover framework is pertinent to the Trident case study as well. At the
conceptual level, top management set out explicit strategies for their ISA. At the logical
level, requirements were analysed and designed and at the physical level, the
implementation of IDE was taking place. Using Nolan's Stage Model, Trident could be
placed at stage 3 moving to stage 4, as the focus of the new IS was on integration so as
best to suit customer needs.
Like Castrol, Mondi and Trident, JNJ PP also remained with the known quantity in terms
of its hardware and capabilities within the crganisation. JNJ PP and Castrol (be th
multinational companies) observed what sister companies were doing overseas, and were
influenced by their experiences. In both instances however, the local projects progressed
at a faster pace than those overseas, S( I the in-company assistance they were hoping to
secure was negated.
5.1 SOFTWARE PACKAGES
Literature supports the view that a software application implementation takes less time
than it takes to develop such a system. (Refer section 2.5). Moreover, software packages
also necessitate an investigation of all business processes. One of the most often cited
downsides to uniquely written systems is that they are overlaid over old processes. (This is
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not to say that organisations don't do the same thing with software packages - for
example, Jl',jJ PP prefer to install their software as is, and allow their users time to get
used to the new software, and only then does reengineering and process redesign take
place.)
At Mondi attention was focused on systems integration - the interfaces from the different
systems and the fact that there were individual departmental systems had inhibited changes
to the business. The decision to implement IDE would provide the organisation with
ready developed programs, a reengineering framework and an implementation
methodology. This view is supported by Payne, director of information services at
Saftiland, Ontario (cited by Appleton, 10(7) who, after implementing an EPJ> solution at
their organisation. suggests that orga . ;)11S should adopt a preference for changing
processes to make them compatible win. (he system. (i.e. customisation of the software
should only take place when absolutely essential.)
Like Mondi, Castrol has chosen to implement IDE without any changes to the software.
Consequently, processes will have to be tailored in such a fashion that they suit the
software. Castrol has chosen to implement the system without using all the functionality
that is available within the software. Jeff Wood (cited by Appleton, 1997), plant manager
at Par Industries states:
"there is a tendency sometimes to become enamoured with
all the bells and whistles thai go with fully integrated ERP
systems, and that can cause problems dOWIl the
toad (the software) can ca-tse a huge disruption if
misapplied"
Castrol has also chosen a phased approach to their implementation of IDE. Within this
phased approach, Castrol are also prototyping the system in a separate environment so
that testing and validation can take place prior to installation into a production
environment.
Along with the focus on processes, integration, time and resources, Trident also sought
application support and proven business practices built into the software. It was found
that senior management were circumspect regarding the software because they could not
confirm that a software package could support what they believed to be their unique
business processes. Comments the sales director of the organisation:
"we are a strong company ill our current culture. We are
nervous that implementing a software package would result
in it (the software package) being susceptible to changing
the culture Of the company. "
Like Castrol, JNJ PP was a multinational company with corporate headquarters overseas.
It was found that the implementations at these organisations were largely influenced by
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implementations overseas.(i.e. that they were not alone in their endeavour to implement
IDE, that there was inter-company expertise and skills.) JNJ PP also used the incremental
implementation approach. Subramanian and Lacity (1997) define incremental approaches
as the practice of dividing large IT projects into multiple, smaller projects; within this
incremental approach there are three different types of implementations, prototyping,
phasing and piloting. JNJ PP, having employed the incremental approach, prototyped the
system in a test environment known within the IDE implementation methodology as a
'conference room pilot'.
5.8 ORGANISATIONAL VALUES
The following organisational values were analysed:
5.8.1 Teams
Process redesign prepares the way for functional departments to dissipate and for process
teams to replace them. In the section on BPR and processes it became clear that teams
facilitated functional interfaces and parallel activities. The literature review highlighted
how teams and not individuals facilitate the work of processes. According to Parker
(1996) many organisations shy away from creating truly cross-functional teams because
ingrained corporate hierarchies actively resist. All four case studies presented in chapter
four undertook business process reengineering with a view to establishing process teams.
At Mondi user ownership was seen as crucial to the success of the project - i.e. project
members were removed from their day to day functions, new employment contracts were
signed, they were assigned new managers and were fully committed to the project. An
incentive scheme was put in place to ensure continued commitment to the project. There
was an intention to move away from functiona, units and this began with the project team.
It is too early in the project to assess how successful the move to team working has been
at Mondi. It was found that this focus on teamwork at Mondi coincided with the
'operational excellence' value discipline of Treacy and Wiersema, which indicates that
such organisations prize the team and not the individual.
At CastroI, as a cons=quence of a previous reenigineering exercise (1995) the organisation
was largely structured into teams. The team focus however, centred only on a number of
areas. Their customer service centres were team structured, likewise their warehousing
and procurement functions.
The team established to implement the software at Castrol was also cross-functional.
However, because of the size of the organisation, skills could not be fuily committed to
the project; moreover, the incentive scheme put in place was not clearly defined, so did
not act as a motivating factor. The problems experienced at Castrol related to work
overload which contributed to project members feeling demoralised.
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At Trident, the project team established to oversee the reengineering and implementation
was drawn from executive managers, senior managers, line managers, key users, IT staff
and external consultants. Like Castrol, team members could not be fully committed to the
project. TIlls also impacted on the project, qS workloads became burdensome. Parker
(1996) contends that teams need senior man" ement participation and influence within the
organisation to be successful. At Trident the project was successful attributable mainly to
the team mix - where problems were experienced, there was enough influence to get a
decision without delay.
At JNJ PP the initial project team was driven by IT. (This problem was set out in section
4.5.6.1). Problems included not having enough influence within the organisation and user
scepticism due to the team not being fully representative of the organisation. The
responsibility for the information system remained with the IT department for 5 years.
During this time there were ongoing credibility problems. At the beginning of 1997 the
responsibility for the system was moved from IT back to the user base; A new team was
established which consisted of senior and line managers from within the organisation.
Appleton (1997) highlights the importance of team-building and communication skills.
JNJ PP learned this through experience. Appleton maintains that implementations require
people to create new work relationships, share information that was once closely guarded
and make business decisions they never were required to make. Comments John Calvert,
operations director of JNJ PP
"we were surprised haw well the upgrade had gone -
because we did ail the right things, for the first time ."
5.8.2 Empowerment
According to Benjamin (1992) the locus of knowledge and hence power in the
organisation changes where a large scale package is being used as an enabler of change in
the organisation. Consequently, organisations will need to reorganise their infrastructures
and responsibilities to support the role ofIT within th. 'rganisation.
The four organisations presented in chapter four all viewed empowerment as a natura!
outcome of focusing on processes instead of functions - indeed, all four organisations
were hoping to achieve this empowerment which in tum would contribute to a new
organisational structure.
5.8.3 Human Resources
A natural consequence of process/team driven, empowered employees implies a variety of
skills which is demanded from employees. Grunwald, CEO of Deloitte & Touche
Consulting Group lies s (cited by Appleton, 1997) submits that organisations focus too
much on the benefits of ERP implementations - and not on the educational content of the
employees to prepare them for the change in systems, thus they cannot take full advantage
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of the process. It is widely accepted that to harness such systems, employee training and
development should be comprehensive. (Goshal and Bartlett, 1994; Parker, 1996; Kotter,
1995).
It was round that Mondi, Castrol and Trident gave high priority to training and re-skilling
of employees. Trident still has one consultant dedicated to training and hand-holding.
INJ PP, from past experience, believe that learning from experience contributes more to
the knowledge enhancement of employees. (Refer section 4.5.6.4).
5.8.4 Risks
Risk associated with IT projects encompasses a variety of issues - i.e. lack of leadership,
lack of vision, communication and the corporate environment. Harris and Katz (1991)
contend that investments in IT represent a major source of business risk, and thus must be
managed effectively through the link with the organisations strategy, the structure of the
organisation, the measurement and control system and the characteristics of the
technology.
It was found that all four organisations presented in Chapter four took a 'known' route
relating to their information systems, as opposed to the point of view expressed by
Hammer and Champy (1990) in their article 'Don't Automate, Obliterate'. In each case
risk assessments highlighted that by staying with one or other competency/capability, the
project would be at a lower risk.
At Mondi a risk assessment revealed that risk would be reduced where the development
team Pondusers had experience with the technology and were knowledgeable in the
application arena. At Castrol, a number of risks were identified: firstly, the size of the
project was in itself a risk, secondly, there was a lack of in-house applications knowledge
and thirdly, vendor support was identified as a risk. To deal with these risks, it was found
that the project was being implemented using a phased approach. This approach was
taken so as to reduce risk and allow competency to build in stages. Training was
scheduled to acquire application knowledge, and the organisation retained the services of
a IDE business partner so as to avoid staff turnover problems at IDE. Trident perceived
competencies as high risk. As such, it was found that extensive training took place to
build application and business knowledge. IT staff were involved in the project from the
outset.
5.8.5 Orltlcal Success Factors
It was found that there was a similarity in the critical success factors identified by the
organisations presented in chapter four. These included top management commitment,
user ownership of the system, and aligning processes to fit the software package instead of
customising the software. JNJ PP came to recognise that user ownership of the system
was crucial, only after an unsuccessful attempt by their IT staff to maintain support of the
system. Comments John Calvert again,
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"we were amazed at how much commitment we got from
the user base within the organisation when they knew they
were responsible for the system...
5.9 BENEFITS
Given that large scale software implementations take time to penetrate into an
organisation's culture, that people take time to develop confidence in the system, that
benefits (and dis-benefits) impact dynamicaily on the organisation, its people, processes
and customers, to accurately measure these benefits requires that the system be in place
for a period of time. JNJ PP is the only organisation that has had the time frame to
measure the impact of the software on the organisation. (Refer sections 4.5.5 and 4.5.6).
At Castrol, Trident and Mondi visible benefits thus far have related to building skills,
redefining processes and information sharing. Consequently, benefits thus far have all
been internal. JNJ PP have found benefit in being able to take on new products and
franchises without changes to their systems, thus satisfying their customers choices.
Table 1 depicts the benefits the four organisations were seeking to gain from their new
information systems.
Expected Be ..efits Mondi CastroJ Trident JNJ
Improved Customer Service X X X X
Online/integrated informatlon X X X X
Better information X X X X
Minimise costs, improve margins X X X
Increase in machine optimisation X X
Cost savings X
Build new skills base/competency X X X X
Reduce headcount X X
Free up resc: .• ces X
Best busines- prlir~"'~ X X
Improve the Silt' ~~• ()ftuf' business X X X X
Increased Re ~n.e X._ -.
Table I
In this chapter, the four organisations presented in chapter four have been analysed
according to a number of interrelating issues. These included business process
reengineering, processes, competencies, capabilities, information systems architecture,
software packages, organisational values, risks, critical success factors and benefits.
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CHAPTERS
S.O SUMMARY AND CONCLUSiON
This chapter will summarise the main findings of this research, suggest further areas for
research. and provide management guidelines relating to ERP application
implementations.
6.1 SUMMARY
The objective of this research was to determine if the implementation of large scale
software packages was being t..ilised to transform organisations as opposed to only
providing a back-office support system. The research showed that the implementation of
ERP applications does have impacts for the organisation and on that ground organisations
are exploiting these applications to accelerate their change initiatives. The impacts
identified stem from the enabling capabilities of information technology.
In the introduction of this research it was suggested that the changing world of business
demanded more from its people. The quest for more information also demanded more
from information technology, hence IT was expected to deliver more. Business demanded
systems that could follow its direction and not inhibit its changes, as was clearly the case
in past decades.
As anticipated, large scale package implementations are viewed as integral to an
organisatlons strategy (where packages have been selected); however, in some instances,
top management still believe that such projects can be delegated downwards and dealt
with at a lower level within the organisation.
The framework of an Information Systems Architecture as put forward by Segars and
Grover (i996) proved to be useful in that it provides organisations with an approach that
takes in all domains of the organisation and its information needs. Segars and Grover
intended the framework to be an architectural approach to IS planning. The fact that an
organisational perspective is taken if the Segars and Grover framework is used, means that
most structures within the organisation are incorporated.
It was found that where senior management had communicated the strategic direction of
the organisation, that where an analysis of the organisation existed in terms of its
competitive approach and its organisational structure, there was an understanding of the
objectives the organisation was desiring to achieve. This also assisted IT in terms of its
objectives. Where senior management had failed to communicate these objectives, the
project developed unintended setbacks. Consequently, the researcher submits that the
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analysis undertaken at the Conceptual Level of the framework is crucial to the success of
large scale software implementations.
At the Logical Level where ,h::: perspectives of middle management are taken ;'1to
scccunt, the researcher found that the success of an implementation of software
applications was largely based on the contribution made by middle management - if the
processing needs were not adequately conveyed, the implementation was slowed down
due ta a revisiting of certain requirements. The various sub-architectures, if planned up-
front, facilitated the setting of priorities for the implementation further down the line.
'Whilst Segars and Grover incmde personnel, organisational and technology profiles at this
levei (i.e. the Logical Level), they do not detail these profiles. The researcher proposes
that BPR, core competencies, core capabilities and organisational values, be incorporated
at this level.
The research sample showed that the business process reengineering projects that
organisations were engaging in were not of the dramatic nature as put forward by Hammer
& Champy (1995), but could rather be classified as ~rocess improvements. The research
found that, even though these exercises could not be considered 'radical' or 'dramatic',
they did however, challenge internal company rules, were customer oriented and
contributed to cross-functional working within the organisation, and indeed, better ways
or doing things.
The attention givan to processes within. these organisations, as a consequence of
implementing a new information system had impacts on other domains within the
organisation. It contributed to knowleuge-sharing within the organisatio.; which in turn,
contributed to a broader knowledge of the business,
The building of this new core competence within the organisation gave management the
confidence to leverage IT to support the business. The also forced and focused attention
on capabilities within the organisation - their IT and their employees together, constituted
a new competency in the organisation.
Tne research also found that the implementation of the software was a greater enabler of
change than was originally anticipated. The impact on the structure of the organisation
was of such a nature that a number of business policies needed revisiting. In some cases
new mechanisms were required within the organisation to manage these objectives. The
issues related to personalities within teams (getting the team mix and the team
accountabilities right), performance evaluation (incentive schemes) and making available
educational programmes to further enhance capabilities and the need to acquire
knowledge.
Employee empowerment as a consequence of team-working and having the correct
information to do their jobs, required a different kind of management style. The
hierarchical structure of the organisation was at odds with the new way of working 111e
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research found that a new kind of leadership needed developing - the old command-and-
control style of management was out of keeping with the new 'informated' organisation.
"
The l-hvsical Level of the framework details the actual implementation of the given
information technologies. Segars and Grover contend that the guide in the implementation
(of software applications) is the overall Information Systems Architecture. The researcher
found that where adequate attention was given to analysis at the Conceptual and Logical
Levels of the framework, the implementation went according to plan with the desired
benefits.
6.2 UM;TATIONS OF THE RESEARCH
The limitations of the research are as follows:
The selection of companies may not be fully representative or random. In working with
companies, data gathering may have been affected by company politics. The wide range
of information technology change initiatives might introduce other Iimita'ions. Only
organisations using the same software architecture were used. My own position as a
consultant within these organisations may have lent to some bias.
6.3 AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
Some global companies are implementing ERP applications world-wide. Two approaches
are taken. In some instances these companies are using one platform, and one
environment and dictating conventions. The other approach allows for companies to tailor
the package to their specific needs. Further research would enhance knowledge as to
which approach is deemed more successful,
This research was based on the implementation of ERP applications as a tool of
transformation strategy. Further research is required to determine the long term benefits
of such a strategy, us the research sample highlighted mostly internal benefits.
Itwould be informative to conduct a similar research using similar organisations who have
employed different methodologies and different software applications to achieve
transformation benefits.
This research has purposefully avoided a focus on purely implementation issues, it would
be useful to research similar projects and focus entirely on implementation and project
management issues.
Some organisations hold that to reengineer and implement ERP systems simultaneously
puts the organis ation at risk. Research into the approach of implementing software
without first reengineering could highlight the benefits of such an approach.
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6.4 MANAGEMENT GUIDELINES
Key findings which may provide guidelines for management are as follows:
Communication from senior executives as to the urgency and importance of the
implementation of large scale software applications in such a way that employees can
relate to the proposed project can contribute to greater understanding within the
organisation. If employees grasp that they are embarking on something of great
importance to the organisation and to themselves greater effort is invested in the project.
Inadequate executive support is frequently a contributor to failed implementations.
Involvement on the steering committee does not constitute the kind of executive support
that the project team is seeking.
Closely linked to top management commitment, is the performance measurement systems
that the organisation has in place. Given that large scale software implementations require
immense effort from employees who are on the project team, incentive schemes, if dearly
defined (i.e. there is recognition of specific accomplishments) facilitates teamworking,
The profile of the project leader for large scale software implementations is such that this
person needs to have support from both senior management and employees. Strong
leadership skills are required of this person. Aside from project management skills, this
person will need to be people oriented, inspiring, charismatic and have a fair amount of
clout within the organisation.
Ownership of the system has to rest with the user base within the organisation. Software
applications are shaped by the input given from employees within the organisation. If the
input does not have the business itself inmind, then the system will be perceived has being
slow to deliver business benefits. IT departments cannot implement such applications in
isolation. This does not mean that such implementations can take place without the input
oUT personnel. The management ofIT personnel also requires careful considerati.in as in
this area a change of direction is required from IT, from programming .0 business analysis
skills. Some IT personnel are hesitant to make the change from programming to business
support.
This leads on to the project team mix. If such applications are tailored by users within the
organisation, then project team members need to be representative of the whole
organisation. Line management needs to be represented so that their requirements are
adequately met and there is buy in of the system.
Often the reason for implementing software applications is to scale down the commitment
to developing and maintaining custom code. Where software applications are customised,
more effort is required to keep up to date with vendor supplied updates to the software.
Added to this is the risk that the customised code will not work with later releases of the
software.
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There needs to be realistic expectations about the project. Time constraints and resource
constraints need to be taken into account. Where organisations cannot commit employees
fully to such a project careful management of the employees time need to take place.
Processes need to be reengineered before selecting a software application. Whilst
software applications might require that some processes need revisiting because of
software constraints, largely, processes will be redefined to suit the business and not the
business suiting the information technology.
The success and acceptance of the software application will depend on the people using
the applications. Considering that there are fundamental changes in the way people do
their work when software applications are implemented, employees need to be prepared
for this changed way of doing things. (i.e. training ann re-skilling requirements of
employees cannot be underestimateo.)
6.5 CONCLUSION
Organisational change is brought about by people and not technology. Technology is
merely the tool which can increase people's capacity to make decisions and thereby
contribute to the change within the organisation. Software packages assist organisations
in their change efforts because they force organisations to re-examine their business, their
processes, their capabilities and ultimately their structures. Software packages thus have
the potential (and are being used) to directly support the creation and implementation of
organisational strategic and transformational plans.
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